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Evidence law in North Carolina senselessly punishes victims of
domestic and sexual violence by broadly sanctioning witness
impeachment with prior convictions––no matter the implicit
prejudice to the witness or how little the conviction bears on
credibility. The North Carolina approach is an outlier. Under Rule
609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the use of conviction evidence
for impeaching witness credibility is confined to felonies and crimes
involving dishonest acts or false statements. Their use must also
satisfy judicial balancing tests aimed at protecting against unfair
prejudice to the witness. The majority of states take a similar or even
more restrictive approach. North Carolina’s corresponding rule,
however, casts a far wider net. It broadly permits parties to impeach
witnesses with an array of convictions, including innocuous
misdemeanors, and affords no judicial discretion to protect the
witness or weigh the potential for juror misuse. The implications are
unavoidable. For survivors of domestic and sexual violence, the
state’s approach to conviction-based impeachment can be especially
devastating.
This Article explores one of the most controversial rules of
evidence––impeaching a witness with her prior convictions––
through the lens of North Carolina’s broad impeachment rule. The
impact of the rule can no longer be ignored, and this Article argues
that change is long overdue. This Article discusses the genesis of
conviction-based impeachment and its modern usage. It spotlights
how the North Carolina rule enables trial lawyers to levy a barrage
of questions at a witness to suggest overtly that the witness is a liar
while covertly implying the witness is a person of untoward
character. By exposing the rule’s impact on victims, particularly
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sexual assault and domestic violence survivors, the Article reveals
how impeachment by prior-conviction evidence in North Carolina is
used as a pretext for improperly assailing a witness’s character. The
Article concludes by proposing statutory reforms to limit priorconviction evidence to its proper purpose while halting the abuses
currently sanctioned by the rule.
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INTRODUCTION
American jurisprudence is founded on the adversarial system. 1 Civil
and criminal trials are waged throughout the nation as a contest between

1. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990) (noting “rigorous adversarial testing”
is the “norm of Anglo-American criminal proceedings”); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516
(1947) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[A] common law trial is and always should be an adversary
proceeding.”); Stephan A. Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary
System, 44 OHIO S T. L.J. 713, 716 (1983) (chronicling the history of the adversarial system and
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two opposing sides. 2 Within this arena, people are haled forth into the
contest as witnesses. 3 Their testimony is public, under oath, and exposed to
the piercing gaze of the fact-finder.4 They offer their accounts under the
direction of the party who called them to testify. And then crossexamination begins. Witnesses are probed; their biases, relationships,
education, perception, demeanor, motives, and more are openly
scrutinized.5 The most controversial tactic within the cross-examination
arsenal involves subjecting a witness to questions about her 6 past criminal
convictions to imply that now, although removed in time from her former
misdeeds, she must be lying on the stand. 7
Evidentiary rules permitting witness credibility to be impeached with
prior-conviction evidence are easily the most criticized within the
adversarial system, with scholars and commentators urging reform for
describing the modern adversarial trial process as “highly competitive” and “tend[ing] to promote
a win-at-any-cost attitude”).
2. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 (1984) (describing the trial process
envisioned by the Sixth Amendment as a “confrontation between adversaries”). Unquestionably,
significant strides are being made in alternative, non-adversarial-based dispute resolution and
restorative justice programs in the civil and criminal system. See Hadgar Dancig-Rosenberg &
Tali Gal, Restorative Criminal Justice, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2313, 2321 (2013) (noting that “the
restorative process is not adversarial” because offenders must take responsibility for their
offenses before engaging with victims to address the harm caused); Timothy R. Rice, Restoring
Justice: Purging Evil From Federal Rule of Evidence 609, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 683, 696–700
(2017) (observing the impact of restorative justice and reentry programs on the traditional
adversarial process and how impeachment by prior conviction undermines these efforts). At its
core, however, the American justice system is adversarial, particularly in the criminal justice
system. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 641 (1991) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (“Trials in this country are adversarial proceedings.”); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 563 (1974) (“[A]dversary proceedings [are] typical of the criminal trial . . . .”).
3. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997) (illustrating a trial as a “colorful
story with descriptive richness,” the narratives of which are told through witnesses).
4. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157–58 (1970) (detailing the importance of the oath,
cross-examination, and demeanor evidence to the truth-finding process for the fact finder).
5. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (describing the adversarial
method of testing witness testimony as the “crucible of cross-examination”); Davis v. Alaska, 415
U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (noting that a less general and more specific “attack on the witness’
credibility is effected by means of cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases,
prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness”).
6. The feminine pronoun is used throughout because this Article focuses on the impact that
conviction-based impeachment has on victims of sexual and domestic violence. These victims are
overwhelmingly female, see Statistics, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
https://ncadv.org/statistics [https://perma.cc/S229-PH8L].
7. Montré D. Carodine, “The Mis-Characterization of the Negro”: A Race Critique of the
Prior Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 524 (2009) (noting that the federal rule
admitting prior-conviction evidence to impeach a witness “is one of the most controversial, if not
the most controversial of all of the rules of evidence”); Ric Simmons, An Empirical Study of Rule
609 and Suggestions for Practical Reform, 59 B.C. L. REV. 993, 995 (2018) (observing that the
federal rule permitting impeachment by prior conviction “is perhaps the most maligned of any
Federal Rule of Evidence”).
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decades.8 The vast majority of this criticism has focused on Rule 609 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence9 and its detrimental impact on the criminally
accused.10 Less criticism has been directed at state rules permitting witness
impeachment with prior convictions, despite the fact that most trials occur
at the state, not federal, level. 11 Even fewer critiques focus on the impact on
victim-witnesses who are subjected to impeachment with their prior
convictions.12 This Article seeks to fill that gap by focusing specifically on
8. As Ric Simmons observes, the critiques are “too numerous to list” in a single footnote.
Simmons, supra note 7, at 995 n.1. Scholarly critiques have been varied. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin,
The Silence Penalty, 103 IOWA L. REV. 395, 415–24 (2018) [hereinafter Bellin, Silence Penalty]
(demonstrating through empirical data the detrimental impact of impeachment with priorconviction evidence on the accused and the silencing effect such rules have on defendants);
Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts Opened the Door to
Impeaching Criminal Defendants With Prior Convictions, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 289–90
(2008) [hereinafter Bellin, Circumventing Congress] (arguing for judicial reform to the balancing
factors courts utilize when considering impeachment by conviction evidence under Rule 609);
John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record—Lessons from the
Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL S TUD. 477, 477 (2008) (arguing for strict
limitations on impeaching accused persons with conviction evidence based on empirical evidence
showing the silencing effect on innocent defendants); Carodine, supra note 7, at 521 (critiquing
racial bias within the criminal justice system and the perpetually unreliable convictions that result
from employing impeachment by prior conviction); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Prior Crime
Impeachment of Criminal Defendants: A Constitutional Analysis of Rule 609, 82 W. VA. L. REV.
391, 409–21 (1980) (arguing Rule 609 violates due process and fair trial constitutional guarantees
when applied to the accused); Rice supra note 2, at 683–89 (criticizing Rule 609(a) as punitive,
stigmatizing, and counter to modern restorative justice approaches to criminal justice); Anna
Roberts, Conviction by Prior Impeachment, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1977, 1992–2001, 2018–36 (2016)
[hereinafter Roberts, Impeachment] (analyzing the flaws perpetuating impeachment by conviction
evidence and arguing for reform based on progressive state approaches); Anna Roberts,
Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 B.C. L. REV. 563, 563–66 (2014) [hereinafter
Roberts, Unreliable Conviction] (arguing prior convictions must be scrutinized for reliable
culpability before consideration as viable impeachment evidence); Anna Roberts, Reclaiming the
Importance of the Defendant’s Testimony: Prior Conviction Impeachment and the Fight Against
Implicit Stereotyping, 83 U. C HI. L. REV. 835, 835 (2016) [hereinafter Roberts, Implicit
Stereotyping] (arguing implicit bias and juror stereotyping is perpetuated by judicial standards
tending to admit prior convictions for impeaching testifying defendants which tends to silence
critical testimony from the accused);.
9. FED. R. EVID. 609.
10. See, e.g., Blume, supra note 8, at 477–80; Carodine, supra note 7, at 521; James H.
Gold, Sanitizing Prior Impeachment Evidence to Reduce Its Prejudicial Effects, 27 ARIZ. L. REV.
691, 691–93 (1985); Nichol, supra note 8, at 391–95; Rice, supra note 2, at 683–89; Roberts,
Impeachment, supra note 8, at 1977–82; Roberts, Implicit Stereotyping, supra note 8, at 836–40;
Roberts, Unreliable Conviction, supra note 8, at 563–66.
11. See, e.g., Dannye R. Holley, Judicial Anarchy: The Admission of Convictions to
Impeach: State Supreme Courts’ Interpretative Standards, 1990-2004, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV.
307, 311–15; Ted Sampsell-Jones, Minnesota’s Distortion of Rule 609, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 405,
425 (2008); Jeff Welty, Overcriminalization in North Carolina, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1935, 1937
(2014) (“[T]he vast majority of criminal prosecutions in the United States happen in state
courts.”).
12. Several factors may contribute to the lack of victim focus in this area. First, courts may
be more lenient in excluding victims’ prior convictions when applying balancing tests that gauge
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how this impeachment issue is addressed in North Carolina, a state whose
evidentiary rules sanctioning witness impeachment with prior criminal
convictions rank among the harshest in the nation to victim-witnesses—
vastly exceeding federal standards and the overwhelming number of sister
states.13 As this Article demonstrates, the critiques aimed at narrower
impeachment standards are amplified when applied to North Carolina’s
regressive rule that, among its other effects, chills testimony 14 and tends to
promote wrongful convictions, 15 racial bias,16 explicit and implicit
stereotyping, 17 and victim blaming. 18
In theory, prior-conviction evidence is admissible for the single,
limited purpose of questioning whether the testifying witness may now be
lying given that she was previously convicted of a crime. 19 The evidence is
said to be inadmissible for the more obvious suggestion that the witness has
a general character bent on criminality, particularly when the witness is the

the viability of the evidence as indicators of untruthfulness against the harm and prejudice that
may come from admitting victim convictions. Second, because the prosecution cannot appeal
acquittals, fewer records of judicial decisions concerning victim prior convictions may be
available. Third, the likelihood of juror misuse and the life and liberty interest impacting the
accused has tended to focus attention more on criminal defendants than victims or lay witnesses.
13. See N.C. R. EVID. 609; infra Part II.
14. State v. Lamb, 321 N.C. 633, 648, 365 S.E.2d 600, 608 (1988) (recognizing the
“chilling” impact of prior criminal activity on a defendant’s decision to testify); State v. Perkins,
235 N.C. App. 425, 763 S.E.2d 928, 2014 WL 3824261, at *3 (2014) (unpublished table decision)
(holding the defendant failed to preserve for appeal his claim that the trial court’s ruling allowing
conviction impeachment evidence chilled his decision to testify because the defendant did not
testify); see also Bellin, Silence Penalty, supra note 8, at 430; infra Section III.C.
15. State v. Cotton, 99 N.C. App. 615, 618–19, 394 S.E.2d 456, 458 (1990); Bellin, Silence
Penalty, supra note 8, at 398–99 (detailing the story of Ronald Cotton, a North Carolina man
famed for being exonerated by DNA evidence, who was impeached with his prior convictions
when he testified to his innocence and observing that “[o]nce a jury learns of a defendant’s
record, it is more likely to convict”); see also Blume, supra note 8, at 477–80. See generally
Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a
Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
1353 (2009) (utilizing empirical evidence to reveal the impact of prior-conviction evidence on a
jury’s decision to convict in close cases, where the concern for erroneous convictions is greatest).
16. Carodine, supra note 7, at 521.
17. Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 15, at 1387 (discussing the “negative halo effect” of a
prior conviction causing jurors to be unsympathetic toward the defendant); Roberts, Implicit
Stereotyping, supra note 8, at 836–40.
18. See infra Section III.A.
19. This presumption has long been criticized as inaccurate and based on a faulty premise.
See generally Todd A. Berger, Politics, Psychology, and the Law: Why Modern Psychology
Dictates an Overhaul of Federal Rule of Evidence 609, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 203
(2009) (chronicling and debunking the psychological assumptions on predictive human behavior
on which impeachment by prior criminal conviction is based). Recent empirical findings also
reveal that jurors do not view prior criminal records as affecting defendant credibility. Eisenberg
& Hans, supra note 15, at 1353.
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defendant.20 Limiting instructions given by presiding judges to jurors
attempt to confine prior-conviction evidence to its narrow, admissible
impeachment purpose. 21 The rule wishfully assumes jurors will
intellectually compartmentalize the evidence to mere witness credibility
and not a propensity to engage in deviant behavior. 22
Despite such doctrinal platitudes, jurors invariably use prior
convictions as evidence of a defendant-witness’s guilt and may deem
victim-witnesses not just untrustworthy, but as lesser human beings
unworthy of protection.23 The deleterious consequences reverberating from
impeachment by prior conviction are inescapable. Jurors are strongly
inclined to punish the witnesses for their prior crimes, leading some
witnesses to forgo testifying entirely. 24 The rule also effectively promotes
negative stereotypes among jurors about victims of sexual assault and
domestic violence while enabling the revictimization of victim-witnesses
who brave testifying. 25
North Carolina’s rule allowing broad, conviction-based impeachment
differs little from the century-old assumption that once a criminal, always a
liar.26 In North Carolina, any witness may be impeached with prior
20. State v. Ross, 329 N.C. 108, 119, 405 S.E.2d 158, 165 (1991) (“[I]t is important to
remember that the only legitimate purpose for introducing evidence of past convictions is to
impeach the witness’s credibility.”); State v. Wilkerson, 148 N.C. App. 310, 320–21, 559 S.E.2d
5, 12 (2002) (Wynn, J., dissenting), rev’d per curiam, 356 N.C. 418, 571 S.E.2d 583 (2002)
(relying on Judge Wynn’s dissent to reverse the lower court).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Redditt, 381 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that the trial
court instructed the jury to limit the use of the defendant’s prior criminal convictions to the issue
of credibility only and concluding, generally, that evidentiary errors from the admission of priorconviction evidence are considered “harmless if the court provides a curative instruction”).
22. United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“The jury is told to
consider the defendant’s prior conviction only on the issue of credibility and not on the overall
issue of guilt. But limiting instructions of this type require the jury to perform ‘a mental
gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody’s else [sic].’” (quoting Nash v.
United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932) (Hand, J.))); Roberts, Impeachment, supra note
8, at 1998 (observing that no empirical evidence supports the concept that jurors are able to
“partition their brains” to limit the use of prior-conviction evidence); Simmons, supra note 7, at
1014 (“[T]hese instructions have a limited effect.”).
23. See Irving Younger, Three Essays on Character and Credibility Under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 7, 10 (1976) (noting that “[d]octrinal purity then becomes
doctrinal corruption” when one recognizes how, theoretically, prior convictions are conceived for
use in evaluating witness credibility yet, practically, are used by jurors for the prohibited purpose
of evincing the witness’s character for criminality). Recent empirical evidence supports this
conclusion. See Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 15, at 1387–89; see also infra Section III.A.
24. See, e.g., Bellin, Silence Penalty, supra note 8, at 400; Blume, supra note 8, at 479
(finding that the primary reason exonerated innocent defendants did not testify was “the fear of
impeachment with their prior convictions.”); see also infra Section III.C.
25. See infra Sections III.A–III.B.
26. At common law, a witness testifying in North Carolina state courts would be subject to
impeachment with any and all prior convictions, no matter the type of infraction or how remote in
time. Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 271 N.C. 276, 279–81, 156 S.E.2d 265, 268–69 (1967);
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convictions ranging from the most violent felonies to common
misdemeanors.27 Unlike the federal rule, which carves out standards for
courts to exclude certain criminal convictions of witnesses, 28 including
victims, the text of North Carolina Rule of Evidence 609(a) offers no
judicial oversight. 29 Moreover, the North Carolina rule fails to distinguish
between convictions for felonies, crimes involving dishonesty, and those
bearing little or no relationship to veracity whatsoever. 30 A witness can be
impeached as a liar for misdemeanor convictions involving injury to
personal property or the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle just as
vigorously as she can be impeached by felony convictions for
embezzlement or perjury. 31
Further exacerbating the negative impact of North Carolina Rule 609,
the state’s highest court has declared itself powerless to exclude priorconviction evidence no matter how extreme the prejudice. 32 The Supreme
Court of North Carolina rejected any suggestion that a trial court has
State v. Griffin, 201 N.C. 541, 542–43, 160 S.E. 826, 827 (1931). Today’s rule remains largely
the same in both form and application. Most convictions within ten years prior to the witness
testifying are available to impeach the witness’s credibility. N.C. R. EVID. 609(b). More remote
convictions are subjected to a strict balancing test. Id. However, in application, trial and appellate
courts have readily allowed stale convictions, thus making the effect of the rule little different
than its common law antecedent. See, e.g., State v. Ross, 329 N.C. 108, 116–19, 405 S.E.2d 158,
163–65 (1991) (finding harmless error in the trial court’s decision to admit a nineteen-year-old
conviction for sodomy); State v. Joyner, 243 N.C. App. 644, 650, 777 S.E.2d 332, 337 (2015)
(finding no error in the trial court’s decision to admit five prior convictions, the most recent of
which was fourteen years prior, despite the trial court’s findings when weighing Rule 609(b)
factors).
27. See N.C. R. EVID. 609(a); see also infra Part II.
28. FED. R. EVID. 609.
29. N.C. R. EVID. 609(a). As currently enacted, North Carolina Rule of Evidence 609(a)
states:
(a) General rule.—For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that
the witness has been convicted of a felony, or of a Class A1, Class 1, or Class 2
misdemeanor, shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public
record during cross-examination or thereafter.
Id.
30. Id. The Federal Rule of Evidence limits prior-conviction evidence to felonies and crimes
wherein the elements require proof of “a dishonest act or false statement.” FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
See also 1 KENNETH S. BROUN, R ICHARD E. MYERS & JONATHAN E. BROUN, BRANDIS &
BROUN ON NORTH C AROLINA EVIDENCE § 98 (8th ed. 2018) (“Like pre-Rule case law, [North
Carolina Rule 609] does not require that the crime have a rational relevance to untruthfulness
. . . .”).
31. See N.C. R. EVID. 609(a); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72.2 (2017) (categorizing
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle as punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor); id. § 14-160
(categorizing willful and wanton injury to personal property as punishable as a Class 2
misdemeanor if damage is less than $200 and punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor if damage
exceeds $200).
32. State v. Brown, 357 N.C. 382, 389, 584 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2003).
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discretion to exclude prior-conviction evidence when offered for
impeachment, describing the language of Rule 609 as “mandatory.”33 And a
recent decision from the North Carolina Court of Appeals appears to
preclude any argument that the rule’s imposition “chills” testimony. 34
While some states have abolished or greatly curtailed impeachment by
prior conviction, or at least provide judicial discretion to protect witnesses,
North Carolina has steadfastly maintained a hard line. 35 Even as the federal
rule has been amended over the years to protect victims and other witnesses
against unfair prejudice, 36 North Carolina’s rule has not.37
As this Article exposes, the regressive nature of North Carolina’s rule
deters and demeans victims of domestic and sexual violence who have
committed even modest criminal misdeeds. As currently codified and
interpreted in North Carolina, impeachment with conviction evidence is
broadly permissive—it need not bear any relationship to untruthfulness,
cannot be excluded by the trial court no matter the detrimental impact on
the victim, exposes the jury to the facts and types of convictions while
hoping the jury will limit its use, and widely affords trial counsel the
opportunity to inject trait-based character presumptions into the trial. This
Article reveals how such a boundless evidentiary rule paves an
unobstructed road for defense counsel to attack a victim’s personal
character as one of questionable repute when she takes the witness stand.
By exposing the rule’s impact on victim-witnesses, this Article
demonstrates how impeachment with prior-conviction evidence may be
used as a pretext for improperly assailing a witness’s character.
This Article calls for reforming North Carolina Rule of Evidence 609
to halt the abuses that it currently endorses which senselessly punish
survivors. Part I examines the history of impeaching witness credibility
with prior-conviction evidence, as well as the underlying premises
supporting the practice. Part II contrasts North Carolina’s broad approach
with those of other jurisdictions and then critically examines its breadth and
application. Part III explores the impact of prior-conviction impeachment
on survivors of sexual and domestic violence to reveal the systemic flaws
33. Id. (“The language of Rule 609(a) (‘shall be admitted’) is mandatory, leaving no room
for the trial court’s discretion.” (emphasis added)).
34. State v. Perkins, 235 N.C. App. 425, 763 S.E.2d 928, 2014 WL 3824261, at *3 (2014)
(unpublished table decision).
35. N.C. R. EVID. 609; Roberts, Impeachment, supra note 8, at 2018–32 (highlighting
Kansas, Hawaii, and Montana as states that have restricted or abolished prior-conviction evidence
to protect against misuse and abuse).
36. See infra notes 119–25 and accompanying text.
37. Brown, 357 N.C. at 390, 584 S.E.2d at 283 (“[T]he official comments to Rule 609(a)
reveal an unequivocal intention to diverge from the federal requirement of a balancing test.”
(emphasis added) (citing N.C. R. EVID. 609 cmt.)).

97 N.C. L. REV. 1553 (2019)

2019]

VICTIMS UNDER ATTACK

1561

in North Carolina’s rigid rule. Part IV then proposes a revised Rule 609
aimed at curtailing the abuse and misuse of conviction evidence when
offered solely for questioning witness credibility.
I. IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTION
Modern rules condoning witness impeachment with prior-conviction
evidence trace back several centuries to the wholesale exclusion of
witnesses who had been previously convicted of “infamous” crimes. 38 Over
time, the categorical exclusion of witness testimony eventually gave way to
practical evidentiary concerns and the need for substantive proof. 39 As
detailed below, the evolution from strict witness exclusion to broad witness
impeachment has raised substantive concerns in today’s trial practice that
bear on due process and fair trial principles.
A.

Origins of Conviction-Based Impeachment

Impeaching witnesses with prior-conviction evidence is rooted in the
ancient English common law tradition of disqualifying felons from
testifying.40 Disqualification by prior conviction originated as a
consequence of attainder for committing an offense punishable by death. 41
The capital offender lost all proprietary and personal rights, including any
notion that such a depraved person could ever again be trusted as a credible
witness.42 The severity of the crime deemed the guilty to be wholly without
credit, his reputation permanently stained by the heinous nature of his

38. Stuart P. Green, Deceit and the Classification of Crimes: Federal Rule of Evidence
609(A)(2) and the Origins of Crimen Falsi, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1087, 1105 (2000)
(noting that the exclusion of convicted persons from testifying dates back to at least the
seventeenth century).
39. FED. R. EVID. 601 advisory committee’s note. The categorical exclusion of witnesses
with criminal convictions penalized innocent defendants who needed exculpatory witness
testimony. 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 601 app. 102, at 10–12 (Mark S. Brodin & Joseph M. McLaughlin eds., Matthew Bender 2d ed.
2019). State and federal rules declaring witnesses with prior convictions incompetent were
eventually abandoned by the mid-twentieth century as irrational and unsound. Id.; see also Rosen
v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918).
40. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *380–81. Under English common law, the
capital offender lost all proprietary and personal rights by “forfeiture and corruption of blood”
based on the nature of his crime, including the competency to testify as a witness in court. Id. at
*381 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at *380. As a result of his heinous crime, “[t]he criminal was then called attaint,
attinctus, stained, or blackened” by his offense. Id.
42. Id. at *380–81; 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A COMMENTARY ON THE L AW OF EVIDENCE
§ 397, at 354–55 (Philadelphia, Kay & Brother 1877). In fact, for a period of time, individuals
accused of capital crimes were prevented from offering testimony at all. 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *380.
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offense.43 The theory held that a crime rendering a person “unworthy to
live” also made him “unworthy of belief.”44 A convicted individual being
dead in law, but not yet in fact, possessed neither rights nor reputation. 45
Categorical disqualification was therefore a mere extension of devoid
status.
By the seventeenth century, testimonial disqualification expanded to
include individuals convicted of “infamous” crimes. 46 Crimes of infamy
included treason, felonies, and crimen falsi offenses––broadly categorized
as crimes wherein an essential element involves lying or deceit, including
perjury, subornation of perjury, forgery, cheating, and the like. 47 As with
attainder, the loss of testimonial integrity was concomitant with the
conviction itself.48
The theory supporting testimonial disqualification evolved along with
its expansion. It shifted from one underpinned by the severity of capital
punishment to a more generalized presumption about the convicted
person’s untrustworthiness. 49 Conviction of an infamous crime cast the
guilty as mendacious by character. 50 In doing so, the expanding definition
of infamous crimes focused on the dishonest nature of the offense. 51
43. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *380–81; 1 S IMON GREENLEAF, A
TREATISE ON THE L AW OF EVIDENCE § 372, at 417 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown
1842) (“The basis of the rule seems to be, that the witness is morally too corrupt to be trusted to
testify.”).
44. GREENLEAF, supra note 43, § 373, at 418 (“[I]t was very natural, that crimes, deemed of
so grave a character as to render the offender unworthy to live, should be considered as rendering
him unworthy of belief in a court of justice.”).
45. Id.
46. 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON L AW § 519, at 725–26
(Chadbourn rev. 1979) (noting the extension of testimonial disqualification to include crimes of
“moral turpitude” by the 1600s).
47. GREENLEAF, supra note 43, § 373, at 418 (observing that “the extent and meaning of the
term, crimen falsi, in our law, is nowhere laid down with precision,” but that term’s origins in
Roman law support “every species of fraud and deceit”); RICHARD NEWCOMBE GRESLEY &
CHRISTOPHER ALDERSON C ALVERT, A TREATISE ON THE L AW OF EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS OF
EQUITY 333 (2d ed. Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson 1848); WHARTON, supra note 42, § 397, at
354; 2 WIGMORE, supra note 46, § 520, at 729–30.
48. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 511 (1989) (noting that convictionbased disqualification was part and parcel to the punishment itself).
49. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 46, § 519, at 726.
50. JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827), as reprinted in 7 THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 406 (John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, Simpkin, Marshal & Co.
1843) (“In the case of mendacity it runs thus: He has violated the obligations of morality not only
in other sorts of ways, but in this very sort of way, on former occasions; therefore it is more or
less probable that so he will on the occasion now in hand.”).
51. WHARTON, supra note 42, § 397, at 355 n.1 (1877) (“It is the infamy of the crime, and
not the nature . . . of the punishment, that destroys competency.”); 2 WIGMORE, supra note 46, at
726 (noting the evolution of the theory supporting testimonial exclusion from punishment to a
theory of morality where “the person is to be excluded because from such a moral nature it is
useless to expect the truth”).
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Notably, disqualification for infamous crimes derived from an assumption
of general character rather than any specific connection to the case, the
parties, or other basis for incompetency. 52 The witness was not disqualified
because he was unworthy to live. Rather, a presumed “insensibility to the
obligation of an oath” for the commission of the infamous crime meant the
person was “morally too corrupt to be trusted to testify.” 53 While the theory
evolved, the effect was the same54: individuals guilty of infamous crimes
were categorically excluded from testifying. 55 No degree of judicial
discretion was permitted; testimonial exclusion was absolute. 56
American common law perpetuated testimonial disqualification by
adopting the theory that dishonest character was a by-product of an
infamous-crime conviction. 57 As late as the early twentieth century, the
categorical exclusion of convicted persons from testifying in American
courts operated as a hard, albeit clear, line;58 however, it was not without
significant penalty to the system of justice that imposed the rule. Rigid
witness-disqualification rules created deleterious consequences in both civil
and criminal trials where innocent third parties suffered the primary impact
through the loss of relevant evidence. 59 As a consequence, the theory
52. GRESLEY & CALVERT, supra note 47, at 328–29. In fact, the common law recognized
numerous testimonial disqualifications based upon classification of persons and interest in the
outcome. Id. at 330–32. These included classes of persons deemed to “labour under a general
incompetency,” including those deemed non compos mentis, young children, individuals “not
influenced by any religious belief,” persons guilty of infamous crimes, and, in the courts of
Scotland, women. Id. at 331–33. The second basis of incompetency derived from the witness’s
connection to the case, including testimonial disqualification of parties and persons personally or
financially interested in the outcome. Id. at 336–37.
53. GREENLEAF, supra note 43, § 372, at 417. This same mendacious character theory would
perpetuate in American common law centuries later with jurists declaring previously convicted
individuals of dubious moral character unworthy of belief. See Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137
Mass. 77, 78 (1884) (declaring that prior convictions demonstrate a “general readiness to do evil”
which supports “the general proposition that he is of bad character and unworthy of credit”).
54. John Leroy Jeffers, Comment, Witnesses—Removal of Conviction of Felony as a
Testimonial Disqualification in Texas, 10 TEX. L. REV. 87, 87 (1931) (“[T]he theory that such
exclusion was an incident to the punishment of the crime being early superseded by the idea that
the untrustworthy nature of the testimony was the basis for refusing its admission.”).
55. GRESLEY & C ALVERT, supra note 47, at 333 (describing incompetency by infamy as a
“bar to the admission of the evidence of the person marked with it”).
56. Id.
57. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 46, § 519, at 725 (concluding that disqualification by criminal
conviction was fully established in American jurisprudence by the end of the 1600s); Jeffers,
supra note 54, at 87.
58. Ralph R. Wood, Comment, Infamy as a Testimonial Disqualification, 2 TEX. L. REV.
227, 228 (1924) (criticizing the categorical disqualification of witnesses convicted of infamous
crimes as having “only one virtue, its certainty. It operates on just and unjust alike”).
59. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 46, § 519, at 726 (noting that “whatever degree the
disqualification may have been thought of as part of the punishment of the offender himself, it
was obvious that this theory could not of itself justify the incidental punishment of innocent
persons who might need the convict’s testimony” (emphasis added)). The rule’s effects were
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supporting conviction-based disqualification fell under severe criticism for
being “illiberal” and “unnecessary.” 60 Among the most strident
condemnations came from English philosopher and legal scholar, Jeremy
Bentham, who proclaimed:
Exclusion knows no gradations: blind and brainless, it has but one
alternative;—shut or open, like a valve, up or down . . . [b]ut a single
transgression of this sort,—what does it prove? . . . [T]hat on one
assignable occasion the convict has been known to fall into that sort
of transgression, which every human adult must also have fallen into
. . . .61
Eventually, mounting scholarly criticism and the ongoing loss of
probative evidence led England to abolish the rule by statute in 1843. 62
American jurisdictions followed suit in the decades thereafter.63 By the
early twentieth century, most had converted rigid disqualification mandates
into rules supporting witness testimony subject to impeachment. 64 In Rosen
v. United States,65 the Supreme Court summarized the then-prevailing trend
jettisoning conviction-based testimonial disqualification in favor of prior
crimes bearing on credibility:

sometimes catastrophic. Percipient witnesses who could offer credible accounts of civil
transactions or torts were per se excluded. In criminal trials, for example, jurors never heard
testimony from witnesses prepared to offer contradictory accounts to those alleged by the
prosecution or alibis supporting the accused. See generally Green, supra note 38, at 1105–06
(describing how testimonial disqualification “penalize[d] innocent defendants”). A complex
series of exceptions and conditions evolved within the common law to account for the loss of
otherwise relevant, valuable evidence. See BENTHAM, supra note 50, at 401–06 (describing a
variety of exceptions to the disqualification of parties from testifying, including necessity, facts
which none but the party would know, and public necessity).
60. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 46, § 488, at 647. See also Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570,
575 (1961) (“Broadside assaults upon the entire structure of disqualifications, particularly the
disqualification of interest, were launched early in the nineteenth century in both England and
America.”); Vance v. State, 68 S.W. 37, 42–43 (Ark. 1902) (chastising disqualification by prior
conviction as having “no valid reason” that “not only suppress[es] evidence” but operates in such
a way that “justice is often thwarted”).
61. BENTHAM, supra note 50, at 407.
62. An Act for Improving the Law of Evidence 1843, 6 & 7 Vict. c. 85 (Eng.) (“[T]he
inquiry after Truth in Courts of Justice is often obstructed by [Incapacities by the present Law,
and it is desirable that full Information as to the Facts in Issue, both in Criminal and Civil Cases,
should be laid before the Persons who are appointed to decide upon them, and that such Persons
should exercise their Judgment on the Credit of the Witnesses adduced and on the Truth of their
Testimony . . . .”).
63. WHARTON, supra note 42, § 567, at 513.
64. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 46, § 488, at 647 n.1 (detailing statutory enactments in England
and American states from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century eschewing
conviction-based witness-disqualification rules in favor of credibility-based impeachment of
witnesses with prior convictions).
65. 245 U.S. 467 (1918).
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[T]ruth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony of all
persons of competent understanding who may seem to have
knowledge of the facts involved in a case, leaving the credit and
weight of such testimony to be determined by the jury or by the
court, rather than by rejecting witnesses as incompetent. 66
The logic espoused in Rosen eventually won the day as rules disqualifying
previously convicted witnesses from testifying fell in almost every
American jurisdiction. 67 Unfortunately, while these rule changes were a
victory for parties who needed evidence that could be offered by persons
with a criminally-stained past, the impact on those who would now testify
would quickly be realized in full force. 68 Today, victims and accused
persons are permitted to testify, subject to being impeached with their
criminal past. The consequence of permissive impeachment, though, is
unavoidable—many choose to remain silent rather than suffer degrading
character attacks.69
B.

Prior Crimes as Evidence of Mendacious Character

The movement favoring impeachment over disqualification was
considered one of progressive reform––particularly for criminal defendants
previously foreclosed from testifying in their own defense. 70 Progressive
change did not, however, come without regressive impact. While the
criminally convicted witness could now testify, his credibility was
castigated by an open foray into his past crimes.71 In most states, crimes of
any and every sort were available as impeachment fodder without
qualification.72 Justice Holmes summarized the justification for broad

66. Id. at 471.
67. Rogers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 325 F.2d 134, 137 (6th Cir. 1963).
68. See, e.g., Bellin, Silence Penalty, supra note 8, at 415–24; Blume, supra note 8, at 477;
Carodine, supra note 7, at 521, 550–52; Roberts, Impeachment, supra note 8, at 1994–2014;
Roberts, Implicit Stereotyping, supra note 8, at 835; Roberts, Unreliable Conviction, supra note
8, at 563.
69. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 39, § 609 app. 100, at 18 (“Fear of public degradation
may make the possessors of a criminal record reluctant to testify, or even to complain of criminal
acts directed against them, to the detriment of the judicial system’s interest in obtaining useful
testimony.”); Bellin, Silence Penalty, supra note 8, at 398–99.
70. Bellin, Circumventing Congress, supra note 8, at 297 (noting that witness impeachment
with prior-conviction evidence “was a byproduct of a progressive reform that removed rather than
added to the obstacles facing convicts (including, of course, many criminal defendants) who
sought to testify”).
71. 3A WIGMORE, supra note 46, § 986, at 861 (“When in the 1800s the disqualification was
abolished, the statute sanctioned the use of convictions for all kinds of crimes by way of
impeachment.”).
72. WHARTON, supra note 42, § 567, at 513 (observing that once states revised rules
formerly disqualifying criminals from testifying, they begin permitting the witness’s record of
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impeachment with any prior crime in an 1884 opinion penned for the
Massachusetts Supreme Court. 73 He postulated that when “a witness has
been convicted of a crime,” the “ground for disbelieving him” is afforded
by the conviction, which, according to Holmes, reveals in the witness a
“general readiness to do evil.” 74 Holmes claimed that it is from this
“general disposition alone that the jury is asked to infer a readiness to lie in
the particular case.”75
The “infamous” crime theory supporting testimonial disqualification
was thus recast into testimonial impeachment theory. American legislatures
followed along, transposing the grounds for witness disqualification into
grounds for impeaching witness credibility. 76 In doing so, however, they
universally failed to analyze the very premise on which Holmes based his
theory.77 Most legislatures, like North Carolina’s then and today, blindly
assumed a prior criminal offense begat dishonest testimony without
considering the crime itself or its correlation to untruthfulness. 78
More than a century later, Justice Holmes’s hypothesis about
mendacious character as a derivative of criminal conduct remains firmly
entrenched in American law. 79 Under the federal rules, and those in fortynine states, witness credibility may be challenged with prior-conviction
conviction to “be put in[to] evidence in order to impeach credibility”); 3A WIGMORE, supra note
46, § 986, at 861.
73. Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884).
74. Id.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. See Advisory Committee’s Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the
United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 297 (1969) (noting that
impeachment-based statutes across the states “consist[] in substance of the common law grounds
of disqualification transposed into grounds of impeachment”).
77. Mason Ladd, Credibility Tests—Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 166, 175 (1940)
(“[N]one [of the statutes abandoning disqualification in favor of impeachment by prior conviction
were] drafted upon the basis of the specific relationship of the crime to the character of the
witness for truthfulness.”).
78. Id.; see, e.g., Blakney v. United States, 397 F.2d 648, 649–50 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(McGowan, J. concurring) (noting of the D.C. statute adopting impeachment-based use of prior
convictions that “[t]here is apparently no relevant legislative history, so we can only speculate as
to why the attainder continued to some degree in the form of permissive employment of the past
conviction to impeach credibility”); State v. Carter, 326 N.C. 243, 250, 388 S.E.2d 111, 116
(1990) (concluding that, under North Carolina Rule 609(a), convictions for discrediting a witness
are admissible without the crime having any “rational relevance to untruthfulness” (quoting 1
HENRY BRANDIS, BRANDIS ON NORTH C AROLINA EVIDENCE § 112, at 484 (3d ed. 1988))).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 555 F.2d 1273, 1276 (5th Cir. 1977) (“The rationale
of the rule allowing impeachment by the use of former convictions is that unbelievability may be
inferred from defendant’s general readiness to do evil . . . [and that] [p]rior convictions may
indicate the accused has a criminal nature and . . . propensity to falsify his testimony.” (emphasis
added)); People v. Castro, 696 P.2d 111, 118–19 (Cal. 1984) (in bank) (repeating the Holmes
rationale from Gertz and concluding that “[t]he [p]eople point to no other rational justification for
felony impeachment”).
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evidence.80 Although the types of convictions permitted to impeach
witnesses vary, the theory remains the same. Ostensibly, a person who has
been previously convicted of a crime is less apt to offer a truthful account
of the facts when testifying at a subsequent trial. 81 When conviction-based
impeachment is untethered from crimes correlating to dishonesty, the
theory is sustained on this bare assumption alone. 82 That Justice Holmes’s
hypothesis is psychologically viable is unfounded. 83 Many crimes have no
bearing on a person’s veracity whatsoever.84 Studies suggest that their
predictive value for future untruthfulness is fundamentally flawed. 85
Unsurprisingly, the multilayered assumptions justifying the conclusion that
convictions translate to false testimony have been repeatedly derided as
“junk science at its worst.”86 The distinct likelihood that the jury will use
prior-conviction evidence to punish the witness, however, is inescapable. 87
80. Roberts, Impeachment, supra note 8, at 2027 (highlighting Montana as the lone state
prohibiting conviction-based impeachment of all witnesses).
81. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (concluding that the jury is permitted to infer
that a witness who has a prior criminal conviction is “less likely than the average trustworthy
citizen to be truthful in his testimony”).
82. Roderick Surratt, Prior-Conviction Impeachment Under the Federal Rules of Evidence:
A Suggested Approach to Applying the “Balancing” Provision of Rule 609(a), 31 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 907, 910 (1980) (“The rationale for prior-conviction impeachment is that a person who has
committed a crime may have less of a general propensity for ‘truthfulness’ than a person without
a criminal ‘record.’”).
83. Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 707 (7th Cir. 1987) (“The proposition that felons
perjure themselves more often than other, similarly situated witnesses (e.g., a criminal defendant
who has not been convicted of a felony or a prisoner in a civil rights suit whose only prior
conviction is a misdemeanor) is one of many important empirical assertions about law that have
never been tested, and may be false. It is undermined, though not disproved, by psychological
studies which show that moral conduct in one situation is not highly correlated with moral
conduct in another.”); Rice, supra note 2, at 691 (noting that research demonstrates that moral
conduct is situationally dependent). The rule’s validity remains dependent on trait-based
assumptions of human character rooted in Justice Holmes’s unsubstantiated theory. See supra
note 53 and accompanying text. It is easy to see how the theory fails on innumerable fronts. If the
prior crime bears no rational correlation to untruthful acts, the theory is corrupt at the outset. Even
where the crime does involve an element of deceit, a single instance of misconduct is unlikely to
reveal a person’s generalized character for future perjury. See Dannye W. Holley, Federalism
Gone Far Astray from Policy and Constitutional Concerns: The Administration of Convictions to
Impeach by State’s Rules—1990–2004, 2 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 239, 303–05 (2005) (“A record of
conviction of a crime is a provable fact, but there is no evidence that it has the probability of
proving that the person whose credibility is attacked has a greater propensity to lie.” (emphasis
added)); Ladd, supra note 77, at 177–78.
84. Ladd, supra note 77, at 178.
85. Berger, supra note 19, at 207–14 (debunking trait-based assumptions that prior crimes
are predictive of future untruthfulness through psychological studies to conclude that “[b]ecause
Rule 609 overestimates the importance of general character traits, and underestimates the
importance of the situation and context, the psychological assumptions upon which Rule 609 is
based reflect at its very core the Fundamental Attribution Error”).
86. Roberts, Impeachment, supra note 8, at 1992 (“The historical heuristic, which is the
longest historical proffered ‘proof’ of this reality hypothesis––that disobedience to the law is
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Reining in Conviction-Based Impeachment

In the early part of the twentieth century, broad use of convictions for
challenging witness credibility began falling out of favor. The theory that
prior criminal acts suggested a general character for mendacity appeared
unsound, particularly when applied to crimes not involving an element of
dishonesty.88 In turn, the English legal system that first gave life to
impeachment by prior conviction became the first to abandon its use. 89
American jurisdictions retained conviction-based impeachment but began
narrowing the available offenses. Revised rules focused on crimes that
more closely related to untruthfulness, including crimes of moral turpitude
or those involving crimen falsi.90 Similarly, courts began departing from the
stringent approach to impeachment by excluding convictions based on
unfair prejudice considerations. 91
These piecemeal statutory and judicial revisions soon gave way to
comprehensive efforts to reform American evidence law, including
impeachment practices. In 1941, the American Law Institute’s Model Code
of Evidence proposed limiting impeachment with prior-conviction evidence
to offenses involving dishonesty or false statement only. 92 The Model
Code’s approach was not absolute in permitting impeachment with these
limited offenses, either; Rule 303 proposed empowering judges with
discretion to exclude any conviction that raised a substantial danger of

logical evidence of a greater propensity to lie––is ‘junk science’ at its worst.” (quoting Holley,
supra note 83, at 304–05)).
87. Erwin N. Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A. J. 1017, 1021 (1965) (“Is there anyone
who doubts what the effect of [prior-conviction] evidence . . . is on the jury?”). See generally
Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 15, at 1388 (demonstrating through research and studies that jurors
do not use prior-conviction evidence to evaluate credibility but to punish the witness, making the
historical justifications for conviction-based impeachment “unfounded”).
88. Innocuous malum prohibitum misdemeanors are clearly distinguishable from malum in
se felonies. See Ladd, supra note 77, at 181 & n.54.
89. Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36, § 1(f) (Eng.) (prohibiting the use of
prior-conviction evidence to impeach a testifying defendant); see also Robert D. Dodson, What
Went Wrong with Federal Rule of Evidence 609: A Look at How Jurors Really Misuse Prior
Conviction Evidence, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 28–29 (1999) (noting several exceptions recognized
by English courts, including when the defendant placed his character “in issue” and when prior
convictions were used to demonstrate similar acts or motive as those in the crime accused).
90. Julia Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 152, 172 (2017)
[hereinafter Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy] (“By the late nineteenth century, courts in states
including Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Texas, California, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, New
York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Vermont, Wyoming, and Maine were using moral turpitude
as an impeachment standard.”); see infra notes 165–68 and accompanying text.
91. Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 706 (7th Cir. 1987).
92. MODEL CODE OF EVID. R. 106 (AM. LAW INST. 1942).
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undue prejudice when weighed against its probative value as an
impeachment tool. 93
A decade later, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws published the Uniform Rules of Evidence to promote
uniformity across American jurisdictions. 94 Like its predecessor, the
Uniform Rules proposed strict limits on impeachment with prior
convictions, protecting victim-witnesses and accused persons from
improper collateral attacks on character. For witnesses other than the
accused, Rule 21 proposed limiting conviction-based impeachment only to
crimes “involving dishonesty or false statement.” 95 The Uniform Rules
equally emphasized the importance of judicial discretion for courts to
exclude impeachment evidence deemed too prejudicial. 96 Thus, the
Uniform Rules protected victim-witnesses from egregious attacks on their
character with prior convictions wholly unrelated to the narrow class of
crimes involving dishonesty or false statement. 97 At the same time, victims
could be reassured that judges maintained discretion to prohibit unfair
attacks, even with the narrowed class of convictions available.
Therefore, by the latter half of the twentieth century, the common
law’s open approach to making any criminal offense available to impeach
witness credibility was slowly abandoned. At the same time, additional
judicial safeguards for excluding convictions bearing little value in
foretelling a witness’s truthfulness when measured against the harm to the
witness were widely embraced.

93. MODEL CODE OF EVID. R. 303 (AM. LAW INST. 1942); see also Green v. Bock Laundry
Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 513 (1989) (citing Rule 303 and noting its interplay with Rule 106 of
the Model Code of Evidence by allowing any unduly prejudicial evidence to be excluded,
including prior-conviction evidence used for impeachment purposes).
94. See Proceedings of the National Conference on Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
62 HANDBOOK OF THE N ATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM S TATE L AWS
36, 102–03 (UNIF. L AW COMM’N 1953) (documenting the Commissioners’ decision to adopt the
Uniform Rules of Evidence in 1953); Leonard S. Powers, The North Carolina Hearsay Rule and
the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 34 N.C. L. REV. 171, 171–72 (1956). The goal of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence was twofold: uniformity and acceptability. Id. at 172. Whereas the Model
Code of Evidence had been rejected by legislatures and courts as “too drastic” or “too academic,”
the Uniform Rules of Evidence were drafted to be slanted more toward practicing lawyers and
judges than academics. Id. at 171, 172–73 n.10.
95. UNIF. R. EVID. 21. If the witness was the accused in a criminal trial, prior-conviction
evidence was barred unless the defendant opened the door by offering evidence “solely for the
purpose of supporting his credibility.” Id.
96. See id. at 7, 45; see also Green, 490 U.S. at 513.
97. See UNIF. R. EVID. 21. Similarly, limits on using prior convictions against the accused
were intended to “correct the abuse of smearing rather than discrediting a defendant who takes the
stand” that were as well known then as they are now. Id. at 21 cmt.
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Competing Theories and Compromise: Federal Rule 609

When Congress debated the Federal Rules of Evidence, no one
questioned the general premise that a previously convicted individual
would be more willing to lie on the witness stand than the average person. 98
The primary debate centered on which convictions most implicated witness
untruthfulness and whether judicial discretion to exclude convictions
should be permitted. 99 When deciding these questions, two competing
interests beset rule drafters: affording fair trials to those at the mercy of the
justice system and supporting society’s interest in protecting itself against
criminals.100
The original rule crafted by the Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Evidence erred on the side of societal interests in prosecuting
cases.101 Proposed Rule 6–09 called for mandatory admission of all crimes
“punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year” (i.e., felonies)
and any crime involving “dishonesty or false statement” (crimen falsi
offenses), no matter the punishment, when offered for the purpose of
attacking the witness’s credibility. 102 The rule embraced two separate
98. See Advisory Committee’s Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for United
States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 297 (1969) (“A demonstrated instance of
willingness to engage in conduct in disregard of accepted patterns is translatable into willingness
to give false testimony.”); see also Berger, supra note 19, at 205 (noting the legislative history of
Rule 609 demonstrates the psychological assumptions about predictive human behavior based on
prior criminal conduct was accepted “as so seemingly obvious as to be beyond debate” without
concern for whether the study of psychology actually supported the underlying assumption);
Green, supra note 38, at 1114 (“[T]here appears to have been virtually no discussion of the
underlying premise that a person who has been convicted of either a crime of deceit or some other
serious crime is unworthy of belief.”). Yet recent empirical studies reveal that prior criminal
records do not implicate credibility. Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 15, at 1387–88.
99. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 1414 (1974) (listing all the proposals considered for which
convictions to allow for impeachment and discussing judicial discretion); Victor Gold,
Impeachment by Conviction Evidence: Judicial Discretion and the Politics of Rule 609, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2298 (1993).
100. For example, Representative Hogan stated during the House’s discussion on Rule 609(a)
that “[t]he raging debate over impeachment of the accused’s credibility by conviction of a crime
exemplifies the continual attempt by all involved in the judicial system to balance the scales of
justice between the rights of the individual and the rights of society.” 120 CONG. REC. 1414
(1974); see also Gold, supra note 99, at 2303; see generally Bellin, Circumventing Congress,
supra note 8, at 304–07 (chronicling the Advisory Committee’s attempts to craft a rule balancing
competing interests and public policies impacted by conviction-based impeachment).
101. See Advisory Committee’s Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the
United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 295–96 (1969) (allowing admission
of prior convictions without mentioning a judge’s discretion to exclude for reasons of unfair
prejudice); see also Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 515 (1989) (discussing the
historical development of Rule 609).
102. See Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 269
(1973); Advisory Committee’s Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United
States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 295–96 (1969). The proposed rule did not
include judicial discretion to exclude these categories of crimes, limiting their availability only to
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theories. First, felony convictions of any nature were endorsed on the
premise that the severity of the crime implicitly made the witness more
likely to testify falsely. 103 The fact that the crime bore no rational relation to
one’s veracity, may have been the subject of an honest confession, or
closely mirrored the charged offense did not affect admissibility. 104
Separately, crimen falsi convictions were sanctioned on the theory that
commission of a crime involving falsity or deceit directly exhibited
mendacious character and a propensity to lie. 105 Importantly, proposed Rule
6–09 deviated from the common law’s broad approach to witness
impeachment by excluding most misdemeanor offenses. The Advisory
Committee deemed the exclusion of misdemeanors unrelated to dishonest
acts as “warranted by their relatively insubstantial nature.” 106
After settling on the convictions available for impeachment, the next
question concerned whether the rule would grant trial courts the authority
to exclude those they judged unfairly prejudicial. The Advisory Committee
vacillated on the issue. The rule’s varying iterations proposed denying or
granting trial courts latitude to exclude a witness’s prior convictions to
safeguard against unfair prejudice to the witness. 107 Under pressure from a
single, albeit powerful, Senator who opposed the draft rule,108 the final

staleness concerns. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183,
269–70 (1973). The proposed rule essentially mirrored the District of Colombia Code passed by
Congress in 1970 only a few years prior. Green, 490 U.S. at 514–15.
103. See Advisory Committee’s Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the
United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 297 (1969) (concluding that major
crimes suggest a “willingness to engage in conduct in disregard of accepted patterns [that] is
translatable into willingness to give false testimony” (emphasis added)).
104. See id. (conceding that “it may be argued that considerations of relevancy should limit
provable convictions to those of crimes of untruthfulness”).
105. See Advisory Committee’s Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the
United States Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 391 (1971) (adhering to the traditional view
that crimen falsi offenses are relevant to credibility “without regard to the grade of the offense”).
106. Advisory Committee’s Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United
States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 297 (1969).
107. See, e.g., Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 391 (1971) (supplementing the 1969 rule by adding “in either case,
the judge determines that the probative value of the evidence of the crime is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice”). The final version was modeled after recent
congressional action that had stripped judicial discretion from impeachment rules applicable
under the District of Columbia Code. See Green, 490 U.S. at 516–18 (detailing the development
of 609 and discussing its relation to the District of Columbia Code); Gold, supra note 99, at
2298–01 (chronicling the various Rule 609 iterations).
108. See Gold, supra note 99, at 2300–01 (describing Senator John McClellan’s reaction to
the Advisory Committee’s proposal and the Committee’s decision to relent for the betterment of
preserving the entire rules drafting effort).
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version submitted to Congress simply left open the question of trial court
discretion by making no reference to judicial balancing. 109
The ensuing congressional debate over the rule governing convictionbased impeachment dwarfed all others in the rulemaking process.110 The
two chambers essentially split the Advisory Committee’s proposal. The
House adopted an approach consistent with the Uniform Rules of Evidence
by limiting impeachment solely to crimes involving dishonesty or false
statement.111 The House Judiciary Committee observed that including
convictions for any additional crimes raised the danger of unfair
prejudice112 and, notably, that expanded impeachment would have a
deterrent effect on all witnesses.113 A divided Senate, however, narrowly
approved admitting all felony convictions and lesser crimes involving
dishonesty or false statement, without judicial discretion to exclude
either.114
Congressional negotiators eventually wed the House and Senate
proposals together into a single, albeit complex, rule. 115 As adopted,
Federal Rule 609 made admissible for impeachment all crimes involving
dishonesty or false statement without trial court discretion to consider
unfair prejudice. 116 The rule also embraced impeachment with felony
convictions, subject to a heightened test, balancing unfair prejudice when
offered against an accused person. 117 In a notable departure from the
109. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 269–70
(1973). The final proposed version arguably left the question open by not mandating admission of
all felonies and crimen falsi offenses. The proposed rule merely indicated that a conviction of
those types “is” admissible rather than “shall be admitted.” Id. Suffice it to say, the Advisory
Committee wanted out of the fight and for Congress to take on the issue in debate.
110. See Gold, supra note 99, at 2303 (“The extent of the floor debate in the House over Rule
609(a) far exceeded that relating to any other provision in all the proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence.” (citing 120 CONG. REC. 1414–15, 2375–81 (1974))).
111. See 120 CONG. REC. 2381 (1974) (rejecting the amendment that would add non-crimen
falsi felony convictions to 609(a)); see also Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 580 (3d Cir. 1984);
Gold supra note 99, at 2302–04.
112. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 11 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7084–85
(“[B]ecause of the danger of unfair prejudice . . . and the deterrent effect upon an accused who
might wish to testify, and even upon a witness who [is] not the accused, cross-examination of
prior conviction should be limited to those kinds of convictions bearing directly on credibility,
i.e., crimes involving dishonesty or false statement.” (emphasis added)).
113. See id.
114. See 120 CONG. REC. 37076, 37083 (1974); see also Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,
490 U.S. 504, 519 (1989); Gold, supra note 99, at 2304–07.
115. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (1975) (Rule 609 as originally enacted); Bellin, Circumventing
Congress, supra note 8, at 306–07; Gold, supra note 99, at 2307–08.
116. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (1975) (Rule 609 as originally enacted); Gold, supra note 99,
at 2308 n.61.
117. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (1975) (Rule 609 as originally enacted); Gold, supra note 99,
at 2308 n.61. Notwithstanding these textual protections, the factors courts have developed
generally tend to admit prior-conviction evidence for impeachment when offered against accused
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common law tradition, all misdemeanor offenses not involving dishonesty
or false statements were rejected for impeachment purposes. 118
As originally enacted, Rule 609(a) left unclear whether trial courts
maintained discretion to exclude felony convictions for witnesses other
than those testifying on behalf of the criminal defendant—including the
victim herself. 119 Unsurprisingly, courts split over the issue.120 In 1990, the
Advisory Committee proposed softening the rule’s impact on all witnesses
by broadly embracing trial court discretion to exclude felony convictions
unrelated to dishonest acts. 121 The Committee noted that all witnesses have
an interest in being protected against unfair attacks with prior-conviction
evidence.122 It also accepted that some cases necessarily demand
considering the impact of conviction-based impeachment on government
witnesses.123
Pointing to sexual assault cases, the Committee concluded that
impeaching victim-witnesses with “prior convictions that have little, if
anything, to do with credibility may result in unfair prejudice to the
government’s interest in a fair trial and unnecessary embarrassment of the
witness.” 124 Congress agreed, adopting the inclusion of trial court discretion
for all witnesses without public debate. 125
Today, Federal Rule of Evidence 609 represents a marked departure
from former conviction-based impeachment practices. 126 Witnesses may

persons. The effect has been to eviscerate congressional intent discouraging the use of
convictions against defendants. See generally Bellin, Circumventing Congress, supra note 8, at
307–19 (describing the application of judge’s discretion and detailing factor tests that judges
imposed on Rule 609).
118. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (1975) (Rule 609 as originally enacted).
119. Green, 490 U.S. at 505; Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 580–81 (3d Cir. 1984)
(describing the debate over Rule 609 and its applicability to all witnesses and all types of cases).
120. See David A. Sonenshein, Circuit Roulette: The Use of Prior Convictions to Impeach
Credibility in Civil Cases Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 279,
284–85 (1988) (detailing the conflict among the circuits concerning trial court discretion, or lack
thereof, to exclude felony convictions when offered to impeach witnesses in civil cases).
121. Amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence—Rule 609, 129 F.R.D. 347, 353–54 (1990).
122. Id. at 353 (“The danger from the use of prior convictions is not confined to criminal
defendants.”).
123. Id. at 354 (rejecting the suggestion that government witnesses should not be afforded
protection against unfair prejudice from conviction-based impeachment).
124. Id.
125. See Federal Rules of Evidence: Amendment to Rule 609(a)(1) and (2), 132 F.R.D. 307,
307 (1991) (giving notice of the amendment); Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence—
Rule 609, 129 F.R.D. 347, 352 (1990); Gold, supra note 99, at 2307–09.
126. See FED. R. EVID. 609; Bellin, Circumventing Congress, supra note 8, at 307–08 (“As a
preliminary matter, the Rule represents a sweeping departure from prior federal law,
unequivocally rejecting the automatic admissibility of felony convictions that had previously been
the federal norm.”).
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not be impeached with just any prior conviction.127 Automatic admission of
prior-conviction evidence applies only to crimes that require proving (or
the witness’s admitting) dishonesty or false statement as an element. 128
Felony convictions may be admitted only after satisfying judicial balancing
tests designed to safeguard against unfair prejudice. 129 A vast number of
lesser misdemeanor crimes are made inadmissible for impeaching witness
credibility.130 That is not to say the rule is without fault. Appropriately,
scholars have criticized the rule’s impact on accused persons 131 and the
judiciary’s abandonment of the protections the rule textually affords. 132
Compared to its North Carolina counterpart, however, Federal Rule 609
represents significant reform that at least attempts to minimize the harmful
effects accorded by conviction-based impeachment.
In the next part, this Article explores how North Carolina’s adherence
to broad conviction-based impeachment has remained essentially unaltered
for more than a century. While evidence rules throughout the country have
evolved to contend with the undeniable impact of prior-conviction evidence
on all witnesses, North Carolina impeachment rules have not. Part II offers
a comprehensive analysis of the state’s permissive impeachment practices
dating from the common law to current statutory evidence rules. By
revealing the General Assembly’s ongoing conformance to ancient dogma,
coupled with the judiciary’s recalcitrance to embracing modest witness
protection measures, Part II sets the stage for discussing how North
Carolina Rule 609 negatively impacts victims and their participation in the
judicial system.
II. NORTH CAROLINA’S BROAD APPROACH TO W ITNESS IMPEACHMENT
North Carolina impeachment practices remain beholden to antiquated
traditions long since abandoned as unfounded or harmful. Today,
unfettered use of prior-conviction evidence to impeach witness credibility
has been discarded at the federal level and in almost every state. Most

127. See FED. R. EVID. 609 (limiting conviction-based impeachment solely to felony
convictions and crimen falsi offenses); Bellin, Circumventing Congress, supra note 8, at 308.
128. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
129. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1). For non-criminal defendant-witnesses, felony convictions must
pass muster applying Rule 403 scrutiny whereas prosecutors must demonstrate that felony
convictions are more probative than prejudicial when used to impeach criminal defendantwitnesses. Id.
130. FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
131. See sources cited supra note 8.
132. See generally Bellin, Circumventing Congress, supra note 8, at 289 (“This article
spotlights the flawed analytical framework at the heart of the federal courts’ approach to one of
the most controversial trial practices in American criminal jurisprudence—the admission of prior
convictions to impeach the credibility of defendants to testify.”).
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states employ a balanced approach that corresponds to the federal rule in
form and application. 133 Several have adopted stricter standards. 134 Hawaii
and Montana, for example, forbid witness impeachment with priorconviction evidence. 135 Those permitting conviction-based impeachment
often impose strict limits on the types of convictions utilized.136 The nature
of the offense and witness being impeached are determinative factors. 137
Notably, trial courts widely embrace discretion to exclude convictions that
would unfairly prejudice the witness, even in jurisdictions that otherwise
restrict conviction-based impeachment. 138

133. Julia Simon-Kerr, Moral Turpitude, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1001, 1035 [hereinafter SimonKerr, Moral Turpitude] (noting that a majority of states have now joined the federal rule either
through statutory enactment or judicial decisions).
134. See ALASKA R. EVID. 609 (LEXIS through Feb. 15, 2019 amendments); CONN. CODE
EVID. ANN. § 6-7 (Westlaw through Feb. 1, 2019 amendments); K AN. STAT. ANN. § 60-421
(Westlaw through 2019 Leg. Sess.); KY. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw Apr. 1, 2019 amendments);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21 (Westlaw through ch. 9 of the 2019 1st Ann. Sess.); MICH.
R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw through Feb. 1, 2019 amendments); NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.095 (Westlaw
through ch. 2 of the 80th Reg. Sess. 2019); TEX. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw through Mar. 1, 2019
amendments); W. VA. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw through Dec. 1, 2018 amendments).
135. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1 R. 609 (Westlaw through Act 27 of the 2019 Reg. Sess.);
MONT. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw through the 2019 Sess.); State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 661
(Haw. 1971) (holding that admission of prior convictions to impeach criminal defendants’
credibility unreasonably imposes on defendants’ right to testify).
136. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21 (Westlaw through ch. 9 of the 2019 1st Ann.
Sess.); MICH. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw through Feb. 1, 2019 amendments); NEV. REV. S TAT.
§ 50.095 (Westlaw through ch. 2 of the 80th Reg. Sess. 2019); TEX. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw
through Mar. 1, 2019 amendments); W. VA. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw through Dec. 1, 2018
amendments).
137. See ALA. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw through Mar. 15, 2019 amendments); ALASKA R. EVID.
609 (LEXIS through Feb. 15, 2019 amendments); ARIZ. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw through Feb. 1,
2019 amendments); ARK. R. EVID. 609 (LEXIS through 2019 legislation); F LA. S TAT. ANN.
§ 90.610 (West 2010); GA. CODE. ANN. § 24-6-609 (2013) (LEXIS through 2019 legislation);
HAW. REV. S TAT. ANN. § 626-1 R. 609 (Westlaw through Act 27 of the 2019 Reg. Sess.); IDAHO
R. EVID. 609 (LEXIS through 2019 legislation); IND. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw through Mar. 1, 2019
amendments); IOWA R. EVID. 5.609 (Westlaw through Feb. 1, 2019 amendments); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21 (Westlaw through ch. 9 of the 2019 1st Ann. Sess.); MICH. R. EVID. 609
(Westlaw through Feb. 1, 2019 amendments); N.H. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw through Apr. 15, 2019
amendments); N.J. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw current through May 1, 2019 amendments); N.D. R.
EVID. 609 (LEXIS through Apr. 16, 2019 amendments); OKLA. S TAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2609
(Westlaw through ch. 179 of the 1st Reg. Sess. of the 57th Leg.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.355
(Westlaw through July 1, 2019 amendments); S.D. CODIFIED L AWS § 19-19-609 (Westlaw
through 2019 Reg. Sess.); TENN. R. EVID. 609 (LEXIS through Mar. 25, 2019 amendments);
UTAH R. EVID. 609 (LEXIS through 2019 legislation); VT. R. EVID. 609 (LEXIS through 2019
legislation); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-269 (2015); W. VA. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw through Dec. 1,
2018 amendments); WYO. R. EVID. 609 (LEXIS through 2019 legislation).
138. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21 (Westlaw through ch. 9 of the 2019 1st
Ann. Sess.); Commonwealth v. Harris, 825 N.E.2d 58, 68 (Mass. 2005) (concluding that prior
convictions for sex-related offenses may be admitted for impeachment purposes notwithstanding
the state’s rape shield statute, given the trial court’s discretion to preclude unfairly prejudicial
evidence).
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North Carolina is an outlier in every respect. The North Carolina
General Assembly rejected the modest protections afforded by the federal
rule when crafting the corresponding state rule on conviction-based
impeachment.139 Since then, North Carolina courts have exacerbated the
rule’s negative effects by abandoning rules enabling trial court discretion to
protect witnesses against prejudicial use of conviction evidence. 140
Survivors of domestic and sexual assault, in particular, suffer the
consequences of the state’s ongoing broad approach to impeachment,
which has been almost universally abandoned in common law jurisdictions
contemplating the propriety of conviction-based impeachment. 141
A.

Historical Antecedents to Witness Impeachment

North Carolina adheres to the ancient assumption that persons
convicted of crimes lack credibility in the general sense and are therefore
more likely to lie when testifying as a witness. 142 The rules governing
conviction-based impeachment in North Carolina state courts today are
largely indistinguishable from those developed at common law more than a
century ago. 143 To appreciate the state’s rigid adherence to primitive
dogma, a brief history of North Carolina’s approach to witness
disqualification and unrestricted impeachment is necessary.
From its earliest existence, North Carolina perpetuated the English
common law’s cynicism toward testimony given by previously convicted
persons.144 Early decisions from the Supreme Court of North Carolina
embraced absolute testimonial disqualification for any witness previously

139. See infra Section II.D.
140. See infra Section II.F.
141. See infra Part III.
142. See, e.g., Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 271 N.C. 276, 280, 156 S.E.2d 265, 269
(1967) (confirming North Carolina as a state where general character for dishonest behavior may
be used as an impeachment tool to suggest untruthful testimony); State v. Jones, 63 N.C. App.
411, 421, 305 S.E.2d 221, 227 (1983) (finding that multiple traffic violations generally supported
an attack on the witness’s credibility); James E. Sizemore, Character Evidence in Criminal Cases
in North Carolina, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 17, 22 (1970) (concluding that, under North Carolina
law, “general bad character may be shown for purposes of impeachment”).
143. DALE F. STANSBURY, THE NORTH C AROLINA L AW OF EVIDENCE § 112, at 210 (1st ed.
1946). Analyzing North Carolina common law dating back to the mid 1800s, Stansbury
concluded that “[a]pparently any sort of criminal offense may be inquired about” to impeach a
witness’s credibility. Id. He would note as “wholesome,” however, later judicial dicta suggesting
that “traffic violations and other offenses bearing no relation to credibility” arguably should not
apply. Id. (citing State v. King, 224 N.C. 329, 332, 30 S.E.2d 230, 232 (1944)). The common
law’s broad approach to allowing a wide range of conviction evidence to impeach witness
credibility is remarkably similar to the current version of North Carolina Rule 609, which broadly
permits impeachment with an array of convictions, except for minor traffic offenses and low-level
misdemeanors. See N.C. R. EVID. 609.
144. See supra notes 40–56 and accompanying text.
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convicted of a crime, no matter how material the witness’s testimony to a
party’s case. 145 Impeachment was not an option; persons previously
convicted of crimes were deemed incompetent as witnesses and prohibited
from testifying per se. 146 In fact, the state’s first common law evidence
rules categorically disqualified individuals from testifying for a host of
reasons, including the witness’s status as a civil party or accused
criminal.147
The state’s approach to outright witness disqualification would not
endure, however. 148 By the mid-nineteenth century, most of the former
impediments to witness qualification were dropped by statutory measures
favoring witness testimony, subject to impeachment for the various reasons
previously disabling the witness. 149 Witnesses formerly disqualified from
testifying because of their prior convictions were now free to offer their
accounts in North Carolina courts.150 Doing so, however, exacted a personal
toll. Although the General Assembly lifted the ban on receiving testimony
from previously convicted persons, it placed no restrictions on the types of
prior crimes available to impeach the witness. 151 Any limitations on priorconviction evidence used to impeach a witness would thus come only at the
hands of the judiciary.
The judicial attitude toward emancipated witnesses recently freed
from their former disqualifications, however, was unflinching. Throughout
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the state’s high court
embraced wide-open impeachment, sanctioning unrestricted credibility
145. Keith v. Goodwin, 51 N.C. (1 Jones) 398, 398 (1859) (per curiam) (finding no error in
the trial court’s exclusion of a material witness who had been previously convicted of
manslaughter).
146. Id.; STANSBURY, supra note 143, § 53, at 87.
147. STANSBURY, supra note 143, § 53, at 87–88. North Carolina’s approach to witness
competency echoed English common law by absolutely disqualifying “the defendant in a criminal
case, all parties to a civil action or suit, the husband or wife of a party, and person interested in
the event of the action, persons convicted of crimes, and infidels” as incompetent. Id.
148. The only remaining rigid form of witness disqualification today applies to interested
witnesses in a lawsuit against an estate offering oral statements made by a decedent under the
“Dead Man’s Statute.” See N.C. R. EVID. 601(c). This particular disqualification, however, is
highly limited and easily waived by unwitting parties. See, e.g., In re Will of Baitschora, 207
N.C. App. 174, 186, 700 S.E. 2d 50, 58 (2010).
149. STANSBURY, supra note 143, § 53, at 88. A series of statutory revisions in the mid- and
late nineteenth century eventually abolished most of the categorical disqualifications, including a
person’s status as a previously convicted criminal. Id. These largely mirrored the reforms adopted
in England and other American jurisdictions favoring witness testimony subject to impeachment
over witness disqualification. Ladd, supra note 77, at 174–75.
150. See An Act to Improve the Law of Evidence, ch. 43, pmbl. & § 1, 1866 N.C. Sess. Laws
112, 112.
151. Although the Act to Improve the Law of Evidence proscribed automatic disqualification
of witnesses with prior convictions, the Act did not restrict the scope of prior convictions that
could be leveraged to impeach the witness. See id.
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tests with prior criminal conduct. 152 Few boundaries existed to protect
against abuses. Witnesses could be cross-examined with prior criminal
convictions, indictments, and some uncharged accusations. 153 Over the
decades, unfettered cross-examination became the norm. In State v. Beal154
the court unanimously proclaimed, “Competency and credibility are two
different things. A person may be a competent witness and yet not a
credible one. The law declares his competency, but it cannot make him
credible.”155 The Beal court exalted cross-examination as “one of the
principal tests which the law has devised for the discovery of truth.” 156
Accordingly, the court pronounced that a witness’s interest, motives,
prejudices, knowledge, and other matters bearing on credibility “may be
fully investigated in the presence of the jury.” 157 The court emphatically
concluded that “[o]rdinarily, therefore, a witness may be asked any
questions on cross-examination which tend to test his accuracy, to show his
interest or bias, or to impeach his credibility.” 158
Although penned in 1930, Beal embodied the judicial attitude favoring
unrestrained cross-examination that persisted throughout the century. The
state’s supreme court would later characterize North Carolina crossexamination as “rough-and-tumble” 159 with “few holds barred,” hold that
“questions relating to crime and anti-social conduct are freely allowed,”
and confirm commentator observations that, when impeaching a witness in
the state’s trial courts, “apparently any sort of criminal offense may be

152. See, e.g., State v. Simonds, 154 N.C. 197, 198, 69 S.E. 790, 790 (1910) (proclaiming that
the ability to question a witness that has taken the stand with any crime he or she may have
committed is “settled law”); State v. Thomas, 98 N.C. 599, 604–05, 1 S.E. 518, 521 (1887)
(declaring that a witness who takes the stand, including the criminally accused, may be subjected
“to the peril of being examined as to any and every matter pertinent to the issue” (emphasis
added) (citing McGarry v. People, 2 Lans. 227, 227–34 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1870))); State v.
Lawhorn, 88 N.C. 634, 637 (1883) (“In this state, it is well settled that a witness may be asked on
cross-examination whether he has not been convicted of offences calculated to affect his standing
as a witness.”).
153. See, e.g., State v. Cureton, 215 N.C. 778, 781–83, 3 S.E.2d 343, 345–46 (1939) (finding
no error in cross-examination questions posed to the defendant about being indicted as an
accessory to murder in another case); State v. Maslin, 195 N.C. 537, 541, 143 S.E. 3, 6 (1928)
(excluding mere accusations of crimes, but continuing to permit evidence of criminal indictments
to impeach witness credibility); Thomas, 98 N.C. at 604–06, 1 S.E. at 519–21 (1887) (holding
that questioning whether the witness had been accused of murder in another state was permissible
to test the witness’s credibility).
154. 199 N.C. 278, 154 S.E. 604 (1930).
155. Id. at 300, 154 S.E. at 617.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 300–01, 154 S.E. at 617.
158. Id. at 301, 154 S.E. at 617 (emphasis added).
159. See, e.g., State v. King, 224 N.C. 329, 331–32, 30 S.E. 2d 230, 231 (1944).
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inquired about.” 160 The North Carolina common law viewed any act
remotely bearing on the witness’s moral, ethical, social, or criminal
character as fodder for cross-examination. 161
Further exacerbating the effects of unmitigated cross-examination,
North Carolina also steadfastly refused to place any restrictions on the
types of convictions available to impeach a witness’s credibility. 162 This
stance placed the state among a shrinking minority as other jurisdictions
moved to curtail the prejudice inherent in unmitigated impeachment. 163
Initially, North Carolina’s open approach to impeaching witnesses with the
bias, prejudice, and status that formerly disqualified the witness as
incompetent was well within the norm for the era. The original statutes that
removed testimonial disqualification for persons previously convicted of
crimes tended to make the former impediment an open point of attack
during cross-examination in virtually every jurisdiction. 164 As early as the
late nineteenth century, however, states began distinguishing between
convictions generally and those that more closely impacted witness
credibility; several restricted impeachment to crimes involving moral
turpitude.165 This loosely defined standard encompassed acts that tended to

160. Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 271 N.C. 276, 280, 156 S.E.2d 265, 269 (1967)
(quoting S TANSBURY, supra note 143, § 112, at 210). The wide-open cross-examination approach
permitted in North Carolina courts for testing witness credibility eventually devolved to utter
absurdity. As one commentator noted, prosecutors were permitted to question witnesses on
adulterous liaisons, performing abortions, and calling the district attorney a “punk.” Gary R.
Govert, Evidence—Stuck in a Serbonian Bog: State v. Jean and the Future of Character
Impeachment in North Carolina, 63 N.C. L. REV. 535, 539 (1985) (first citing State v. Small, 301
N.C. 407, 432–33, 272 S.E.2d 128, 143 (1980); then citing State v. Broom, 222 N.C. 324, 325, 22
S.E.2d 926, 927 (1942); and then citing State v. Lynch, 300 N.C. 534, 543, 268 S.E. 161, 166–67
(1980)).
161. STANSBURY, supra note 143, § 111, at 209 (observing that, under North Carolina
common law, “[a]ll kinds of disparaging facts may be elicited” on cross-examination when
impeaching a witness’s credibility).
162. See, e.g., Ingle, 271 N.C. at 280, 156 S.E.2d at 268–69 (reaffirming the North Carolina
rule that any conviction may be used to impeach witness credibility, including acts that have not
resulted in a conviction); State v. Sims, 213 N.C. 590, 593, 197 S.E. 176, 178 (1938) (refusing to
recognize any limitations on the type of convictions, or any other conduct, when cross-examining
a witness’s credibility).
163. See Ingle, 271 N.C. at 280–82, 156 S.E.2d at 269–70 (noting, somewhat disdainfully, the
movement within other states towards limiting impeachment by conviction evidence to various
standards aimed at linking crimes to veracity); King, 224 N.C. at 332, 30 S.E.2d at 232
(conceding that “[i]n many jurisdictions questions as to commission of crime are not permitted at
all, unless addressed to those offenses which have an obvious relation to the virtue of veracity”).
164. Ladd, supra note 77, at 174–75 (“Both in England and in this country the incompetency
has been removed by statute, with but few exceptions, but usually by the same act it is provided
that the conviction of a crime shall thereafter be admissible as a test of the credibility of the
witness.”).
165. Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 90, at 172 (detailing the late nineteenthcentury movement to adopt “moral turpitude” as the standard for conviction-based impeachment,
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condemn the individual as a social outcast. 166 While rudimentary, the
“moral turpitude” standard first began sifting between crimes that might
correlate to an individual’s dishonorable character and those bearing no
relationship to veracity whatsoever. 167 Similarly, some jurisdictions
curtailed impeachment practices by designating “infamous” crimes or
felonies as a mechanism for delineating between convictions suggestive of
a witness’s character for untruthfulness. 168 North Carolina law would not
evolve likewise, however.
In 1938, the Supreme Court of North Carolina decided State v. Sims,169
firmly echoing Justice Holmes’s then fifty-year-old theory that a conviction
of any kind was pertinent to inferring witness untruthfulness. 170 As
previously discussed, Holmes believed criminal convictions generally
revealed a witness’s dishonest character from which the jury could infer
perjured testimony.171 According to this logic, any conviction would
suffice. The Sims court agreed, stating flatly that “[i]t is not the practice in
this jurisdiction to limit the cross-examination for the purpose of
impeachment to felonies, or to crimes involving moral turpitude.”172 A
conviction of any kind remained viable for impeaching the witness under
the theory that “a bad man probably includes lying among his vices.” 173
Convictions for injury to property, 174 public drunkenness,175 disorderly
in states including Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Texas, California, Connecticut, Louisiana,
Maine, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wyoming).
166. Simon-Kerr, Moral Turpitude, supra note 133, at 1025–39 (chronicling moral turpitude
as rooted in civil slander before evolving into an impeachment standard under the rules of
evidence within numerous American jurisdictions).
167. Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 90, at 171. At the time, gender stereotypes
and misogyny played a central role in distinguishing the “moral turpitude” associated with the
individual witness being impeached. Id. As Professor Simon-Kerr eloquently describes, moral
turpitude “embodied many of the country’s self-conscious norms of conduct, such as notions that
oath-breaking and disloyalty in men and sexual impurity in women were particularly damning to
reputation.” Id. At a minimum, however, the standard did at least distinguish between petty
crimes and those more indicative of mendacious character. Id. at 172 n.109.
168. Ladd, supra note 77, at 175 (observing that statutes encompassed an array of specific
limitations on the types of convictions available for impeachment, including felonies, infamous
crimes, those involving moral turpitude, and misdemeanors of a particular nature).
169. 213 N.C. 590, 197 S.E. 176 (1938).
170. Id. at 593, 197 S.E. at 178. Under Holmes’s theory, conviction evidence demonstrated in
the witness a “general readiness to do evil” from which the jury could “infer a readiness to lie in
the particular case.” Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884).
171. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
172. Sims, 213 N.C. at 593, 197 S.E. at 178. The court would further state that crossexamination “is not limited to crimes” and that any act tending to impeach the witness’s character
was cross-examination fodder. Id.
173. 1 HENRY BRANDIS, Jr., BRANDIS ON NORTH C AROLINA EVIDENCE § 107, at 398 (2d ed.
1982).
174. See, e.g., State v. Blackwell, 276 N.C. 714, 724, 174 S.E.2d 534, 541 (1970).
175. See, e.g., id.
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conduct,176 unlawful possession of liquor, 177 motor vehicle offenses, 178 and
traffic violations179 all branded the witness as a liar as equally as
convictions for embezzlement or perjury. 180
The unapologetic adherence to limitless conviction-based
impeachment prevailed in North Carolina throughout the twentieth century,
even as its viability waned. 181 While other states and federal courts moved
to rein in impeachment abuses, particularly against the criminally accused,
North Carolina jurisprudence remained firmly entrenched. 182 The Supreme
Court of North Carolina in Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp.183 recoiled at
the burgeoning movement toward restricting the scope and nature of
criminal convictions available for impeaching witnesses. 184 While readily
acknowledging that unrestrained conviction-based impeachment was being
abandoned throughout the country, the court reviled these reforms as
injecting uncertainty, pithily declaring, “Thus does the serpent of
176. See, e.g., id.
177. See, e.g., State v. King, 224 N.C. 329, 331, 334, 30 S.E. 230, 231, 233 (1944) (holding
that impeaching a witness with a litany of criminal convictions, including possession of liquor
and disorderly conduct, was proper but the trial court’s exclusion of the records supporting the
convictions was not an abuse of discretion).
178. See, e.g., State v. Atkinson, 39 N.C. App. 575, 580, 251 S.E.2d 677, 681 (1979)
(upholding a prosecutor’s use of the defendant’s multiple prior motor vehicle convictions as
proper conviction-based impeachment “relevant to show [the] defendant’s repeated and abiding
contempt for the law and, thereby, his lack of trustworthiness”).
179. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 63 N.C. App. 411, 421, 305 S.E.2d 221, 227 (1983) (upholding
the trial court’s decision to admit the defendant’s entire twenty-five year driving record, showing
traffic violations dating back to 1956, as “relevant to show defendant’s lack of credibility”).
180. As Dean Ladd observed in 1940, impeachment by prior conviction is not based on any
specific tendency of the witness to falsify his testimony. See Ladd, supra note 77, at 176. Rather,
it serves primarily to “brand the witness with the stigma of distrust” in the purely general sense.
Id. Yet classifying drunkenness, running a red light, or failing to pay a parking ticket as
convictions that suggest untruthfulness “is nonsense” whereas crimes involving actual falsity may
actually be useful to testing the witness’s credibility. Id. at 182.
181. See, e.g., King, 224 N.C. at 332, 30 S.E.2d at 232 (conceding that “[i]n many
jurisdictions questions as to commission of crime are not permitted at all, unless addressed to
those offenses which have an obvious relation to the virtue of veracity”); Sizemore, supra note
142, at 22 (“In many states, the inquiry into past criminal conduct and convictions is limited to
those types of crimes which reflect on truth and veracity, such as fraud, forgery, embezzlement,
perjury, and the like. However, in North Carolina, where general bad character may be shown for
purposes of impeachment, no such limitation is observed.”).
182. In fact, the court would take the opposite approach to addressing the prejudice to a
person criminally accused when impeached with a litany of prior criminal convictions. Rather
than recognizing the obvious likelihood that the jury would convict based on the prior
convictions, the court claimed impeaching a defendant with prior convictions was more probative
to the defendant lying on the witness stand because he “has a direct interest in the outcome of the
case.” State v. Ross, 295 N.C. 488, 493, 246 S.E.2d 780, 784 (1978). The court apparently failed
to recognize that the defendant’s bias as a witness with a stake in the outcome would be true
regardless of his status as a prior-convicted person.
183. 271 N.C. 276, 156 S.E.2d 265 (1967).
184. See id. at 280–82, 156 S.E.2d at 269–70.
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uncertainty crawl into the Eden of trial administration.” 185 Limitations
recognized by other courts were chastised as “oversensitive . . . to the
feelings of the witnesses.” 186 Offering trial courts discretion to exclude
convictions was deemed “inexpedient.”187 Instead, the Ingle court
unabashedly maintained that one’s general character for mendacity could
be derived from any criminal conviction, including violations of motor
vehicle laws.188 According to the court, holding steadfast to unrestrained
use of convictions to attack witness credibility had the “virtue of
certainty.”189 The reforms aimed at associating convictions with untruthful
behavior were acknowledged and then summarily rejected. 190
The Ingle court was equally recalcitrant to concerns that the
unchecked use of prior-conviction evidence would raise the specter of
unfair prejudice, even when applied to the defendant-witness. By the time
Ingle was decided, commentators accepted that jurors were prone to using
conviction evidence beyond gauging an accused person’s testimony but
also (if not primarily) for the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged
crime.191 The court chose to absolve itself of these misuses by claiming
“[j]urors are intelligent people” and “[r]esponsible counsel will not abuse
it.”192 Yet, North Carolina cases are replete with examples of defendants
being cross-examined with a host of prior convictions not relevant to
untruthfulness, without an assessment of the obvious potential for jurors to

185. Id. at 281, 156 S.E.2d at 269 (quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, H ANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 43, at 90–91 (1954)).
186. Id. at 280, 156 S.E.2d at 269.
187. Id. at 281, 156 S.E.2d at 269.
188. Id. at 281–82, 156 S.E.2d at 270. The Ingle court conceded that the limits proposed
within the Uniform Rules of Evidence were perhaps better than others for confining convictions
more closely to untruthful criminal behavior, yet held fast to the proposition that anything less
than an “unblemished general character” was fodder for cross-examination of a person’s
credibility, including motor vehicle laws. Id. at 281–82, 156 S.E.2d at 269–70.
189. Id. at 282, 156 S.E.2d at 270.
190. Id. at 281–82, 156 S.E.2d at 270 (conceding the propriety of limiting impeachment to
convictions for crimes involving dishonesty or false statements as proposed by the Uniform Rules
of Evidence but deciding that a conviction of any sort could still “cast some doubt” on the
witness’s credibility).
191. See Ladd, supra note 77, at 184–86 (noting how the defendant-witness is left in the
unenviable position of choosing between remaining silent and the “reasonable speculation” that
the jury will use conviction evidence for “the propensity of the accused to commit the crime as
well as to falsity”); see also Erwin N. Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A. J. 1017, 1021 (1965)
(noting the defendant’s “two almost hopeless alternatives” and the obvious impact on jurors
confronted with prior convictions offered against an accused—no matter the instructions to the
contrary); Sizemore, supra note 142, at 17 (observing that when “character evidence is paraded
before the jury there is a natural inclination to reward a good man or to punish a bad man,
regardless of the merits of the particular case”).
192. Ingle, 271 N.C. at 282, 156 S.E.2d at 270.
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misuse them as circumstantial evidence of guilt. 193 Even when offering
occasional statements in dicta that trial courts have authority to curb abuses
and discretion to prevent cross-examination from going “too far,” appellate
decisions reiterated the open impeachment rule with conviction evidence. 194
As one scholar aptly concluded, “North Carolina courts do not directly
consider the prejudicial effect of impeachment evidence, nor do courts limit
cross-examination to serious crimes or those bearing on veracity.” 195
Instead, North Carolina courts assigned the task of balancing the prejudice
associated with conviction-based impeachment to the same jury asked to
convict.196 Ignoring the obvious impact on witnesses confronted by their
past misdeeds was one of several failures of North Carolina’s Wild West
impeachment practice. A victim had to choose between testifying and
having her entire criminal record paraded before the jury or withdrawing
and having her attacker go unpunished. 197
As the judiciary remained entrenched in regressive impeachment
practices, the best opportunity for reform became a state evidence code
crafted to resemble the Model Code or Federal Rules of Evidence. In the
early 1980s, rules drafters set to that task with hopes of improving the
complicated rules and outmoded traditions that had come to define
common law evidence in North Carolina.

193. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 357 N.C. 382, 390, 584 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2003) (finding no
error in the court’s admission of the defendant’s prior “malicious wounding” conviction despite
its obvious potential for juror misuse in a case alleging murder); State v. Blackwell, 276 N.C.
714, 724, 174 S.E.2d 534, 541 (1970) (finding no prejudice in the admission of convictions for
injury to property, public intoxication, disorderly conduct, and violation of prohibition laws);
State v. Neal, 222 N.C. 546, 547, 23 S.E.2d 911, 912 (1943) (finding no error in the trial court’s
decision to admit “various infractions” including “larceny, vagrancy, nuisance and violation of
the prohibition law” without weighing the prejudice to the witness or the fact that none of the
convictions had any bearing on untruthfulness); State v. Jones, 63 N.C. App. 411, 421, 305
S.E.2d 221, 227 (1983) (finding no error in the trial court’s decision to admit the defendant’s
fourteen traffic offenses over a twenty-five year span to impeach the defendant’s credibility in
case alleging vehicular manslaughter).
194. See, e.g., Blackwell, 276 N.C. at 726, 174 S.E.2d at 541; Neal, 222 N.C. at 547, 23
S.E.2d at 912 (upholding the use of multiple convictions unrelated to veracity while suggesting
that “whether the cross-examination goes too far or is unfair is a matter for the determination of
the trial judge”).
195. Thomas C. Manning, Impeachment: The Dilemma of the Defendant-Witness in North
Carolina, 13 N.C. CENT. L.J. 35, 36–37 (1981); see, e.g., Jones, 63 N.C. App. at 421, 305 S.E.2d
at 227 (1983) (finding defendant’s fourteen traffic violations over a twenty-five-year span was
“admissible for impeachment, and [was] relevant to show defendant’s lack of credibility”).
196. Manning, supra note 195, at 37 (“The burden of balancing the prejudice of character
impeachment against its probative value falls largely upon the jury.”).
197. See Michael W. Patrick, Toward a Codification of the Law of Evidence in North
Carolina, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 669, 694 (1980) (characterizing North Carolina’s
unrestricted conviction-based practice as “seriously undermin[ing] the policy against use of
character and misconduct as circumstantial evidence”).
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Adopting an Evidence Code: Opportunity for Reform

By the latter half of the twentieth century, North Carolina’s need for a
reformed evidence code was undeniable. 198 The amalgamation of decisional
law and statutory enactments that comprised the state’s body of evidence
law created an untenable framework for judges and practitioners. 199 As one
commentator lamented,
[t]he rules governing the introduction of evidence often lie buried in
the hundreds of volumes of North Carolina decisions . . . . Even
when the judge or practitioner can leisurely search for the applicable
rules, the hunt too often ends revealing no law on point or numerous
precedents seemingly at war with themselves. 200
The General Assembly responded to the growing need for an
accessible evidence code in 1979, directing the Legislative Research
Commission to study the state’s evidence laws and propose a
comprehensive code. 201 Four years later, the Commission delivered its
Report to the 1983 General Assembly. 202 The Commission’s Evidence
Laws Study Committee observed that the state’s evidence laws were
“complex and confusing,” consisted of a “morass of cases and statutes,”
and often resulted in “no clear answer” when consulted. 203 Adopting a
centralized code offered the opportunity to make the rules of evidence more
accessible and easier to use for judges and trial lawyers alike. 204 Most

198. As early as 1946, in the first edition of his treatise on North Carolina evidence, Dale
Stansbury observed that the “law of Evidence is in need of considerable overhauling.”
STANSBURY, supra note 143, at VIII.
199. See Walter J. Blakey, Moving Towards an Evidence Law of General Principles: Several
Suggestions Concerning an Evidence Code for North Carolina, 13 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1, 5 (1981)
(“The evidence law of North Carolina is a complex and confusing mixture of common law and
narrow statutes.”).
200. Patrick, supra note 197, at 669–70 (discussing the need to reform North Carolina
evidence law and calling for modified adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
201. H.R.J. Res. 65, 1979 Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (N.C. 1979).
202. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM’N, EVIDENCE L AWS: REPORT TO THE 1983 GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF NORTH C AROLINA i (1982). The Commission’s Evidence Laws Study Committee
initially met ten times, approving half of a proposed evidence code. Id. at ii. The Commission
sought approval for further study, which the General Assembly approved in 1981. Id. The
Evidence Laws Study Committee met eight additional times before approving a final, fully
integrated evidence code for consideration to the General Assembly. Id.
203. Id. at iii. The Evidence Laws Study Committee found that evidence law in the state
lacked clarity, often provided no answer to evidence questions, relied on slow-evolving decisional
law, and failed to provide trial lawyers and judges with easily accessible guidance for arguing and
ruling on evidence issues in the heat of trial. Id.
204. Id. (“The most compelling reason why North Carolina should codify the law of evidence
is to make that law easier to find and use.”).
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notably, however, it meant less reliance on a slow, evolving common law
and would “serve as a vehicle for badly needed reform.”205
The Evidence Laws Study Committee proposed that the General
Assembly adopt an integrated code largely based on the recently enacted
Federal Rules of Evidence.206 In crafting the proposed rules, the Committee
took a logical approach by integrating the Federal Rules of Evidence with
existing North Carolina evidence law. It concluded that “[a]n evidence
code should retain the principles of North Carolina evidence law that are
superior to the federal rules but not those that are outmoded.” 207
Regrettably, the Committee ultimately decided that the state’s broad
approach to conviction-based impeachment was not “outmoded,”
proposing minimal changes to impeachment with conviction evidence
while largely leaving intact the practices that typified North Carolina
common law.208
C.

North Carolina Rule 609

Initially, the Evidence Laws Study Committee proposed
comprehensive reform to the state’s widely permissive impeachment
practices. In 1980, the Committee’s first draft of Rule 609(a) embraced a
logical, refined approach by limiting convictions available for
impeachment to crimes involving deceit, dishonesty, or false statement. 209
The original draft read as follows:
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible
if elicited from him or established by public record during crossexamination or thereafter but only if the crime involved some element
of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing upon the witness’s
propensity to testify untruthfully, such as perjury or subordination of
perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement or false
pretense or other crime in the nature of crimen falsi.210
As proposed, the rule would have protected all witnesses, including
victims, against broad forays into their criminal histories with crimes
unrelated to dishonesty. Regrettably, the Committee’s initial proposal was
discarded three years later for reasons not made known in the legislative
205. Id. (emphasis added).
206. Id. at iv–v.
207. Id. at vi.
208. See id. at 59–61.
209. Memorandum from Donald B. Hunt, Comm. Counsel, Leg. Res. Comm’n, to Evid. Law.
Study Comm. 3 (May 6, 1982) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (detailing the
original proposal for North Carolina Rule 609).
210. Id. (emphasis added).
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history of the rule drafting. 211 The final version submitted to the General
Assembly encompassed a vast array of criminal convictions, echoing the
state’s common law practice. 212
The 1983 General Assembly formally codified impeachment by prior
conviction in North Carolina Rule of Evidence 609. 213 The rule largely
follows the structure of the federal rule but diverges significantly in the
types of crimes available to impeach a witness. As originally adopted,
North Carolina Rule 609(a) stated:
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime punishable
by more than 60 days confinement shall be admitted if elicited from
him or established by public record during cross-examination or
thereafter.214
The final approach taken by the Evidence Laws Study Committee and
later approved by the General Assembly echoed the common law approach
to impeaching witnesses with most convictions. The rule did not limit
convictions to crimes of dishonesty bearing directly on untruthfulness, such
as those involving perjury, embezzlement, and fraud. 215 It offered no
rational correlation between the nature of the crime and untruthfulness
whatsoever.216 And the rule placed only marginal limits on the severity of
the crime by excluding convictions punishable by less than sixty days’
confinement.217 In fact, the rule linked conviction-based impeachment to
the vast array of criminal convictions used as aggravating factors in
sentencing rather than tying impeachment to crimes directly associated
with dishonesty. 218 The theory was purely punitive. A witness could be
punished on the witness stand with a prior conviction that would later
enhance punishment if convicted of a new crime.
211. The reasons for limiting impeachment to convictions based only on crimes of dishonesty
and false statement are not indicated in the record. All that may be discerned is that the final,
proposed rule rejected the original form in favor of broader conviction usage without reference to
the nature or type of crime.
212. See LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM’N, supra note 202, at 59–60.
213. An Act to Simplify and Codify the Rules of Evidence, ch. 701, § 1, 1983 N.C. Sess.
Laws 666, 673 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 (2017)).
214. Id. (emphasis added).
215. See id.; 1 KENNETH S. BROUN, BRANDIS & BROUN ON NORTH C AROLINA EVIDENCE
§ 98, at 337–39 (7th ed. 2011).
216. State v. Carter, 326 N.C. 243, 250, 388 S.E.2d 111, 116 (1990) (concluding that, under
North Carolina Rule 609(a), convictions for discrediting a witness are admissible without the
crime having any “rational relevance to untruthfulness” (quoting 1 HENRY BRANDIS, JR.,
BRANDIS ON NORTH C AROLINA EVIDENCE § 112, at 484 (3d ed. 1988))).
217. N.C. R. EVID. 609(a) (1983).
218. See LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM’N, supra note 202, at 60 (describing the standard in
609(a) as “the standard used in the Fair Sentencing Act in defining an aggravating factor”).
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Diverging from the Federal Rule

North Carolina Rule 609(a) is significantly more permissive than its
federal counterpart in both form and function.219 The federal rule narrows
the range of convictions available for impeaching witnesses to felony-level
crimes and those that involve dishonesty or false statement. 220
Impeachment is thereby restricted in scope to serious crimes that may
generally suggest untruthful character and those crimes of any severity that
directly correspond to untruthfulness. 221 Like the common law before it,
however, North Carolina Rule 609(a) offers no such distinctions. The rule
is not tied to severe crimes, but instead incorporates a wide array of lesser
misdemeanors as impeachment material.222 Moreover, the scope of lowlevel misdemeanors is not narrowly tailored to those crimes involving
deceit or falsity.223
North Carolina Rule 609(a) is also less forgiving in function. As
originally drafted and currently codified, the rule’s text affords no
discretion for trial courts to guard against unfair prejudice to impeached
witnesses, including victims. 224 This textual absence represents a significant
divergence from the federal rule. 225 In federal trials, generic felony
convictions that do not involve dishonest acts or false statements are not
per se admissible to impeach a witness. 226 Federal Rule 609(a) mandates
that trial judges weigh the admissibility of a conviction not directly
correlated to untruthfulness by balancing its probative value in revealing
untruthful character against its prejudicial impact. 227 Federal judges are

219. State v. Ross, 329 N.C. 108, 118, 405 S.E.2d 158, 164 (1991) (noting that the North
Carolina rule is “more permissive than its federal counterpart”).
220. FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
221. Id.
222. N.C. R. EVID. 609(a); see discussion infra Part IV.
223. Id.; see discussion infra Part IV.
224. Compare N.C. R. EVID. 609(a) (1983) (Rule 609 as originally enacted), with N.C. R.
EVID. 609(a) (2017).
225. See State v. Brown, 357 N.C. 382, 390, 584 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2003) (asserting that the
text of Rule 609(a) affords “no room for the trial court’s discretion”).
226. FED. R. EVID. 609(a); State v. Ross, 329 N.C. 108, 118–19, 405 S.E.2d 158, 164 (1991)
(observing that the federal rule requires the trial court to balance the probative value of the
witness’s conviction against its prejudicial effect).
227. FED. R. EVID. 609(a). Under the federal approach, trial courts must weigh the
conviction’s probative value in questioning credibility against the danger it may have in
prejudicing the witness or case. Id. Where the prejudicial effect substantially outweighs the
probative value in questioning credibility, the trial court has discretion to exclude the conviction.
Id. This approach is markedly different from North Carolina Rule 609(a) which affords no direct
textual discretion for trial courts to exclude convictions offered for impeachment purposes. N.C.
R. EVID. 609(a). Certainly, North Carolina Rule 403 can and should be read in harmony with
Rule 609(a) to give trial courts discretion to exclude convictions. See discussion infra Section
II.F.
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thereby empowered to shield witnesses from unfair attacks with generic
felony convictions, including victims testifying as government witnesses. 228
The text of Federal Rule 609(a) also acknowledges the fundamental
difference between impeaching a neutral witness and an accused person
with prior-conviction evidence. 229 The federal standard for impeaching
testifying defendants with generic felony-level convictions is higher than
all other witnesses given the danger that the jury will use the evidence to
convict rather than to question the defendant’s veracity. 230 North Carolina
Rule 609(a) offers no similar protection to defendant-witnesses. Prior
crimes that have identical attributes with the charged crime may be
admitted against a testifying defendant, 231 even though same-crime
convictions carry the highest degree of prejudice and likelihood for juror
misuse.232
While other jurisdictions followed the federal approach to reining in
conviction-based impeachment, North Carolina’s modifications were slight
at best.233 The most significant alteration involved limiting the use of stale
convictions.234 At common law, North Carolina courts refused to time-limit
the age of a conviction—a conviction twenty-five years past was just as
viable as a recent conviction for discrediting the witness. 235 Mirroring the

228. FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
229. Id. at 609(a)(1)(A)–(B) (incorporating a higher standard for admitting felony-level
convictions against a defendant-witness than the lesser standard employed for witnesses in civil
cases and those other than the defendant in a criminal case).
230. See id. at 609(a) (permitting the trial court to exclude felony-level convictions that do not
involve a dishonest act or false statement when offered to impeach a defendant-witness if the
prejudicial effect even slightly outweighs the conviction’s probative value in questioning truthful
testimony).
231. See, e.g., State v. Little, 163 N.C. App. 235, 242–43, 593 S.E.2d 113, 118 (2004)
(finding proper impeachment of the defendant with a prior conviction for larceny in a case
charging the defendant with first-degree burglary).
232. See, e.g., State v. Norris, 101 N.C. App. 144, 148, 398 S.E.2d 652, 654 (1990) (finding
that the defendant’s prior conviction for incest was “so similar” to the current allegations for child
rape that admitting it would have clearly prejudiced the defendant when applying the balancing
factors in Rule 609(b)).
233. See WALTER JAMES BLAKEY, DEAN P. LOVEN & GLEN WEISSENBERGER, NORTH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE, 2017 COURTROOM MANUAL 456 (2017) (describing Rule 609(a) as “only
slightly more restrictive than the prior common law”); see also State v. Ross, 329 N.C. 108, 118,
405 S.E.2d 158, 164 (1991) (“North Carolina’s version of Rule 609(a) is more permissive than its
federal counterpart in that its only limitation on evidence of a witness’s convictions is that the
crime be punishable by more than sixty days confinement.”).
234. N.C. R. EVID. 609(b). North Carolina Rule 609(c), (d) and (e) made modest changes to
the use of convictions for pardoned crimes, juvenile convictions, and convictions on appeal. Id. at
609(c)–(e). Because these provisions are beyond the scope of this Article, they are not addressed.
235. Laura E. Crumpler & Gordon Widenhouse, An Analysis of the New North Carolina
Evidence Code: Opportunity for Reform, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 53 n.378 (1984)
(observing that no common law case suggests time restrictions on convictions used to impeach);
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federal rule, North Carolina Rule 609(b) treats convictions more than ten
years removed (from the later of the conviction date or release from
confinement) as ostensibly inadmissible. 236 Counsel offering a stale
conviction for impeachment purposes must convince the trial court that
admitting the conviction is in the interest of justice. 237 In doing so, the
proffering counsel is tasked with demonstrating that the conviction’s
impeachment value is substantially more probative to untruthfulness than
the prejudicial effect it would have against the witness.238
E.

North Carolina Rule 609(a) Revision and Regression

The General Assembly amended Rule 609(a) in 1999 to clarify the
types of convictions permissible for discrediting witness testimony. 239
Where the original standard was based on convictions “punishable by more
than 60 days confinement,” the revised rule states the types of crimes,
rather than the term of confinement. 240 North Carolina Rule 609(a) now
provides:

see, e.g., State v. Jones, 63 N.C. App. 411, 421, 305 S.E.2d 221, 227 (1983) (admitting the
defendant’s entire twenty-five year driving record showing traffic violations dating back to 1956).
236. N.C. R. EVID. 609(b); see State v. Brown, 357 N.C. 382, 390, 584 S.E.2d 278, 283
(2003) (determining that a defendant’s 1986 conviction fell within the ambit of Rule 609(a), and
not the more restrictive 609(b), because the defendant had not been released from confinement for
the conviction until “1991 or 1992” and the defendant’s trial in 1998 placed the 1986 conviction
“well within ten years from the date of defendant’s release from confinement”); Ross, 329 N.C. at
119, 405 S.E.2d at 164 (noting that, unlike Rule 609(a), North Carolina Rule 609(b) “is identical
to the federal rule” and therefore presumes that stale convictions are more prejudicial than
probative of a witness’s “general character for truthfulness”).
237. N.C. R. EVID. 609(b). The reforms included in Rule 609(b) limiting the use of remote
convictions were the most significant modification to the common law approach that placed no
time restrictions on the conviction. Crumpler & Widenhouse, supra note 235, at 53 n.378
(observing that no common law case suggests time restrictions on convictions used to impeach).
Regrettably, as much as the rule speaks to the presumptive inadmissibility of stale convictions,
modern North Carolina appellate courts continue to cling to tradition by repeatedly finding either
no error or harmless error in trial court decisions to admit convictions well past the ten-year mark.
See, e.g., Ross, 329 N.C. at 120–21, 405 S.E.2d at 165 (finding harmless error in the trial court’s
admission of a fifteen-year-old conviction in Virginia for sodomy despite its prejudice and having
zero relationship to untruthful character); State v. Joyner, 243 N.C. App. 644, 650, 777 S.E.2d
332, 335–37 (2015) (finding no error in the trial court’s failure to make specific findings
supporting the use of five stale convictions to impeach the defendant); State v. Hensley, 77 N.C.
App. 192, 194–95, 334 S.E.2d 783, 784–85 (1985) (finding harmless error in the trial court’s
decision to admit while failing to weigh the prejudice of the defendant’s thirteen-year-old
conviction).
238. N.C. R. EVID. 609(b).
239. Act of May 21, 1999, ch. 79, sec. 1, § 8C-1, 1999 N.C. Sess. 114, 114 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 (2017)) (amending the Evidence Code to make admissible
for the purposes of impeachment evidence of a witness’s conviction of a felony or Class A1,
Class 1, or Class 2 misdemeanor).
240. Id.
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(a) General rule.—For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a felony, or
of a Class A1, Class 1, or Class 2 misdemeanor, shall be admitted if
elicited from the witness or established by public record during
cross-examination or thereafter. 241
Although perhaps not intentional, the 1999 revision effectively
regressed conviction-based impeachment towards the wide-open
impeachment practices of the pre-rules era given the state’s movement
toward expanding crimes and increasing penalties. Today, Rule 609(a)
makes the vast majority of North Carolina state crimes available for
witness impeachment. The North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory
Commission currently identifies 2,206 unique crimes that may be admitted
under Rule 609 given their classification. 242 The Commission’s most recent
summary of felony and misdemeanor offenses indicates that eighty-six
percent of all crimes in North Carolina may be used to impeach
witnesses.243 Only 349 total offenses are excluded. 244 These low-level,
Class 3 misdemeanors primarily consist of petty offenses like littering 245
and impermissible posting of advertisements. 246 A total of 795 felonies and
1,411 varying misdemeanors may currently be used to discredit a
witness.247 These numbers will continue to increase if the trend of
expanding crimes continues in North Carolina, as it has in recent years.248
In the five-year period from 2008 to 2013, the General Assembly averaged
an additional 16.8 new felonies and 17.5 new misdemeanors per year. 249
241. N.C. R. EVID. 609(a) (emphasis added).
242. See N.C. SENTENCING & POL’Y ADVISORY COMM’N, FELONY C LASSIFICATION UNDER
THE S TRUCTURED SENTENCING ACT (2018), [hereinafter N.C. FELONY CLASSIFICATIONS],
https://www.nccourts.gov/documents/publications/offense-classifications/felony-list-2018.pdf?
CmxDfaPpOW5kONSYs4fxE2b34uYX8.23 [https://perma.cc/76CT-GLA4]; N.C. SENTENCING
& POL’Y ADVISORY COMM’N, MISDEMEANOR CLASSIFICATION UNDER THE S TRUCTURED
SENTENCING ACT (2018), [hereinafter N.C. MISDEMEANOR CLASSIFICATIONS],
https://www.nccourts.gov/documents/publications/offense-classifications/miademeanor-list-2018.
pdf?FvP.iinNlu8aw.0UtReGkz.e185Shu4a [https://perma.cc/7BUS-9XN2].
243. See N.C. FELONY CLASSIFICATIONS, supra note 242; N.C. MISDEMEANOR
CLASSIFICATIONS, supra note 242.
244. See N.C. FELONY CLASSIFICATIONS, supra note 242; N.C. MISDEMEANOR
CLASSIFICATIONS, supra note 242.
245. N.C. GEN STAT. § 14-399(c) (2017).
246. Id. § 14-145.
247. See N.C. FELONY C LASSIFICATIONS, supra note 242; N.C. MISDEMEANOR
CLASSIFICATIONS, supra note 242.
248. See Welty, supra note 11, at 1939 (chronicling the precipitous rise in criminal statutes
adopted by the North Carolina General Assembly and overcriminalization concerns in the state).
Jeff Welty’s comprehensive review of the trend in statutory enactments is alarming. Between
1986 and 2011 alone, the General Assembly increased the number of sections in Chapter 14,
which contains North Carolina’s criminal code, by almost twenty-five percent. Id. at 1940.
249. Id. at 1942.

97 N.C. L. REV. 1553 (2019)

2019]

VICTIMS UNDER ATTACK

1591

And many preexisting crimes have been reclassified to have a harsher
punishment since Rule 609(a) was revised, suddenly making crimes that
were previously unavailable for impeachment into cross-examination
fodder.250 The correlative impact on witness impeachment cannot be
ignored given that the standard used in Rule 609(a) ties admissible
convictions to broad criminal categories.
When amending the standard employed under Rule 609, the General
Assembly compounded the negative impact of impeachment by prior
conviction on witnesses and trial outcomes by opting not to correlate the
type of conviction available to impeach a witness with crimes involving
dishonesty.251 Today, felony convictions for impaired driving, 252 beach
bingo,253 and dog fighting254 are as admissible as embezzlement, 255
extortion,256 and perjury. 257 Misdemeanor convictions for aggressive
driving, 258 failing to vaccinate a pet, 259 fastening a boat to a bridge, 260 and
disorderly conduct261 stand alongside misdemeanor forgery, 262 passing
worthless checks, 263 and blackmailing. 264 The only basis for impeaching a

250. Id. at 1943. When Rule 609 was first adopted, commentators viewed it as making at least
some modest reform to the otherwise limitless common law. INST. GOV’T, UNIV. N.C. CHAPEL
HILL, NORTH C AROLINA LEGISLATION 1983: A S UMMARY OF LEGISLATION IN THE 1983
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF INTEREST TO NORTH C AROLINA P UBLIC OFFICIALS 67 (Ann L. Sawyer
ed. 1983). At the time, the Institute of Government noted that simple assault could “not be used”
to impeach a witness. Id. Today, simple assault is available to impeach a witness. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-33(a) (2017); N.C. R. EVID. 609(a).
251. BROUN, supra note 215, § 98, at 337–38 (observing that, true to its common law
antecedent, North Carolina Rule 609 “does not require that the crime have a rational relevance to
untruthfulness”); Franklin Miller Williams, Note, The New North Carolina Rules of Evidence:
Privileges, Relevancy, Competency, Impeachment, and Expert Opinion, 62 N.C. L. REV. 1290,
1297 (1984) (concluding that Rule 609 can “be criticized for admitting evidence that may have no
relation to the credibility of the witness”).
252. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138.5(b) (2017) (classifying habitual impaired driving as a
felony).
253. Id. § 14-309.14(2) (classifying beach bingo as a felony).
254. Id. § 14-362.2(a) (classifying dog fighting as a felony).
255. Id. § 14-90(b)(2) (classifying embezzlement as a felony).
256. Id. § 14-118.4 (classifying extortion as a felony).
257. Id. § 14-209 (classifying perjury as a felony); see also N.C. R. EVID. 609(a).
258. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-141.6(c) (2017) (classifying aggressive driving as a Class 1
misdemeanor).
259. Id. §§ 130A-25(a), -185 (classifying failing to vaccinate a pet as a misdemeanor); see
also N.C. MISDEMEANOR CLASSIFICATIONS, supra note 242, at 31.
260. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-80 (2017) (classifying fastening a boat to a bridge as a Class 1
misdemeanor).
261. Id. § 14-288.4(c) (classifying disorderly conduct as a Class 2 misdemeanor).
262. N.C. MISDEMEANOR C LASSIFICATIONS, supra note 242, at 4 (classifying common law
forgery as a Class 1 misdemeanor under the North Carolina Structured Sentencing Act).
263. N.C. GEN, STAT. § 14-107(d)(3) (2017) (classifying passing worthless checks as a Class
1 misdemeanor).
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witness with crimes clearly removed from false acts is the outmoded
assumption that criminality of any kind corresponds to a dishonest
character. In that sense, the current North Carolina Rule 609 perpetuates
the same unsupported, ancient assumption that a witness’s prior
convictions generally correlate to her subsequent untruthfulness, no matter
the type or nature of the crime. 265
As detailed in the following parts, the General Assembly’s decision to
adopt a broad classification standard for Rule 609 opens the door to lawyer
abuse and juror misuse. Jurors are unlikely to view a witness’s prior
conviction for disorderly conduct or aggressive driving as an indication that
the witness is currently lying under oath. They are far more prone to view
the witness as predisposed to antisocial behavior, regardless of the merits
of her testimony or the case itself. 266
F.

Judicial Recalcitrance to Reform

Judicial recalcitrance to modern evidence rules aimed at preventing
trial abuses has erased the initial hope for modest reform in impeachment
practices. When the North Carolina Rules of Evidence were first enacted in
1983, commentators expected greater flexibility for trial courts to manage
the types of evidence presented to juries. 267 They noted that the discretion
mandated by the rules represented a marked improvement from the
common law’s rigid commands. 268 The North Carolina Institute of
Government similarly described the rules as generally being “more liberal
264. Id. § 14-118 (classifying blackmail as a Class 1 misdemeanor); see also N.C. R. EVID.
609(a).
265. By rejecting the common law’s broad approach to witness impeachment, Federal Rule
609 would exclude some of the aforementioned crimes outright and would enable the trial court
to exclude many of the others. As lesser crimes that do not require proving a dishonest act or false
statement, the misdemeanor offenses for aggressive driving, failing to vaccinate a pet, fastening a
boat to a bridge, and disorderly conduct would be wholly excluded for impeachment purposes.
FED. R. EVID. 609(a). A federal judge would also have discretion to exclude the felony offenses
having little probative value toward evaluating the witness’s character for dishonesty (e.g, beach
bingo). Id. The only offenses that would be per se admissible under the federal rule would be the
crimes of embezzlement, extortion, perjury, forgery, passing worthless checks, and blackmailing,
given how they directly implicate dishonest character. See id.
266. Ladd, supra note 77, at 186; Sizemore, supra note 142, at 17 (observing that when
“character evidence is paraded before the jury there is a natural inclination to reward a good man
or to punish a bad man, regardless of the merits of the particular case”).
267. Crumpler & Widenhouse, supra note 235, at 2, 13 (anticipating that the then-newlyenacted evidence code would “check the abuses involved in the interpretation and application of
evidentiary principles” and that trial courts would have “the discretion needed to apply the rule[s]
to each case as fairness and justice require”).
268. Id. at 53 n.378; Manning, supra note 195, at 37 (observing the “harshness” of North
Carolina’s “all-inclusive” rule on impeachment with conviction evidence); Patrick, supra note
197, at 673 (noting the difference between the approach to offering trial court discretion under the
federal rules “[i]n contrast to the common law’s propensity to rely on rigid rules”).
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than current law by granting greater discretion to the trial judges.”269 Trial
judges were empowered to apply the rules “to each case as fairness and
justice requires.”270 As a result, scholars anticipated that the former abuses
encountered in cross-examination would be curtailed significantly given
the broader discretion granted to trial judges to evaluate all forms of
relevant evidence. 271 This was especially true for convictions offered to
impeach witnesses, which were among the most susceptible to abuse. 272
The judicial attitude toward the new rules, however, would prove
commentators and scholars wrong on both fronts.
Unquestionably, the overarching discretion afforded to trial courts
under the newly enacted rules offered an opportunity for judicial
intervention to prevent impeachment abuses. 273 Most notably, the
delegation of broad oversight to trial courts to exclude unfairly prejudicial
evidence provided a clear avenue for judicial winnowing of convictionbased impeachment. 274 This authority was crystalized in North Carolina
Rule of Evidence 403.275 The state’s adopted version of Rule 403 mirrors
the federal rule, granting trial courts discretion to exclude relevant evidence
that, on balance, creates too great a risk of unfair prejudice. 276 Practitioners
and scholars alike expected that the policy supporting Rule 403’s mandate
would apply broadly to all types of relevant evidence. 277 They noted that
the rules of evidence were adopted as a single, comprehensive code 278 and
269. INST. GOV’T, UNIV. N.C. CHAPEL HILL, supra note 250, at 66.
270. Crumpler & Widenhouse, supra note 235, at 13.
271. Id. at 23 (concluding that the limitations found in Rules 608 and 609 would
“significantly alter the law in North Carolina” for impeaching witness credibility); Govert, supra
note 160, at 540; Amanda F. Spence, Note, Evidence—Cross-Examination—Impeachment of
Witnesses—State v. Williams, 330 N.C. 711, 412 S.E.2d 359 (1992), 71 N.C. L. REV. 2059, 2059
(1993).
272. Crumpler & Widenhouse, supra note 235, at 47.
273. Id. at 52–53 (observing that if courts read the rules on conviction-based impeachment “in
tandem with Rule 403” the cumulative effect would serve to reduce the “likelihood of undue
prejudice in this area”). Trial court discretion is particularly appropriate for evaluating the
propriety of discrediting witnesses with prior convictions for crimes unrelated to dishonest acts.
See, e.g., Abshire v. Walls, 830 F.2d 1277, 1281 (4th Cir. 1987) (observing that minor crimes not
involving dishonesty are worth “almost nil on the question of whether the jury should” believe the
witness).
274. N.C. R. EVID. 403; see Crumpler & Widenhouse, supra note 235, at 13 (noting that Rule
403 affords discretion for judges to evaluate the fairness of admitting each item of evidence
proffered).
275. N.C. R. EVID. 403.
276. Compare N.C. R. EVID. 403 (permitting exclusion of evidence if the risk of unfair
prejudice outweighs the probative value), with FED. R. EVID. 403 (same).
277. Crumpler & Widenhouse, supra note 235, at 15 (“Rule 403 erects a standard that every
item of relevant evidence should meet.”); Patrick, supra note 197, at 673 (noting that Rule 403
“expressly authorizes the trial judge to exercise discretion to exclude relevant evidence”).
278. Crumpler & Widenhouse, supra note 235, at 3 (observing that “[t]he rules were not
adopted in isolation” but were designed to operate in tandem).
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that Rule 403 served as a barrier over which all relevant evidence had to
pass.279 Thus, if read in tandem, Rule 403 would serve as a discretionary
check on the broad convictions generally deemed relevant to impeaching
witness credibility under Rule 609(a).280 This logic was echoed at the time
by federal courts interpreting Rule 403’s clear mandate as a “rule of
exclusion that cuts across the rules of evidence.” 281 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina took the opposite approach, favoring the
common law tradition of unimpeded impeachment without regard to the
prejudicial impact or harm to the witness. 282
Since the passage of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence in 1983,
the state’s judiciary has repeatedly declared itself powerless to exclude
prior-conviction evidence that meets the requirements of 609(a) when
offered for impeachment purposes.283 In State v. Brown,284 the Supreme
Court of North Carolina rejected any basis for allowing trial court
discretion to exclude convictions under Rule 609(a), no matter the
prejudice to the witness, relevance to untruthful behavior, or likely impact
on the jury’s decisionmaking. 285 At trial, the defendant argued that his prior
conviction so closely related to the charged offense that its admission

279. Id. at 15.
280. Id. at 26–27 (“Rule 403, with its independent requirement that probative value outweigh
potential prejudice, should provide the extra measure of protection against some of the abuses
inherent in the use of evidence of other crimes.”).
281. Jones v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 844 F.2d 500, 505 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting Shows v.
M/V Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1983)). Several federal appellate courts viewed Rule
403 as a qualifier to Rule 609 where a specific standard was not included in the rule. See, e.g.,
Abshire v. Walls, 830 F.2d 1277, 1281 (4th Cir. 1987) (concluding that Rule 403 must be read in
conjunction with Rule 609); Czajka v. Hickman, 703 F.2d 317, 319 (8th Cir. 1983) (“Rule 609
does not foreclose the district court’s duty under Fed. R. Evid. 403 to weigh the probative value
of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice.”). Others would view Rule 609 as
controlling. See, e.g., Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 705–06 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding that
Rule 403 was not intended to supplant Rule 609); Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 582 (3d Cir.
1984) (concluding that the legislative history did not support federal Rule 403 modifying Rule
609). Congress would amend Rule 609(a) in 1990 to clarify that Rule 403 applies to all witnesses
other than the criminal defendant when evaluating the impeachment viability of convictions
unrelated to dishonest acts and false statements. H.R. D OC. NO. 101-142, at 2 (1990).
282. See State v. Brown, 357 N.C. 382, 390, 584 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2003) (foreclosing Rule
403’s application to conviction-based impeachment standards).
283. Id. (asserting that Rule 609(a) affords “no room for the trial court’s discretion”); State v.
Perkins, 235 N.C. Ct. App. 425, 763 S.E.2d 928, 2014 WL 3824261, at *2 (2014) (unpublished
table decision) (citing Brown in confirming the trial court’s decision to admit the defendant’s
prior-conviction evidence if defendant elected to testify); State v. Lynch, 217 N.C. App. 455, 462,
720 S.E.2d 452, 456 (2011) (granting a new trial after the trial court’s decision to exclude priorconviction evidence in violation of the “mandatory” language in Rule 609); Outlaw v. Johnson,
190 N.C. App. 233, 247, 660 S.E.2d 550, 561 (2008) (finding error in the trial court’s decision to
exclude convictions under Rule 403 under the controlling decision in Brown).
284. 357 N.C. 382, 584 S.E.2d 278 (2003).
285. Id. at 390, 584 S.E.2d at 283.
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would be unfairly prejudicial. 286 He urged the trial judge to exclude the
conviction under Rule 403, arguing that the conviction’s low probative
value for untruthfulness was substantially outweighed by its obvious
prejudicial impact. 287 The trial court denied the objection and admitted the
conviction, refusing to employ Rule 403’s balancing test. 288
The Supreme Court of North Carolina endorsed the trial court’s
decision, claiming the legislature foreclosed any basis for trial courts to
exclude evidence otherwise admissible under Rule 609(a), notwithstanding
the clear discretion afforded trial judges under Rule 403.289 The court
maintained that the language within Rule 609(a) required “mandatory”
admissibility of all convictions falling within its purview. 290 According to
Brown, the rule’s text left “no room for the trial court’s discretion.” 291 The
court maintained that, unlike the rule’s federal counterpart, North Carolina
Rule 609(a) included no balancing test. 292 This textual absence revealed to
the court “an unequivocal intention to diverge from the federal requirement
of a balancing test,” which embraced prejudicial impact, particularly to the
defendant.293 As a consequence, trial court discretion to protect against
unfair conviction-based impeachments was judicially nullified for all
witnesses—civil or criminal, victim or accused—testifying in North
Carolina courts.
Today, the Brown decision stands firmly entrenched in North Carolina
jurisprudence for the proposition that every conviction falling within the
purview of Rule 609(a) must be admitted.294 The Supreme Court of North
Carolina ignored its own precedent, 295 scholarly admonitions, 296 and the
286. Id. at 389, 584 S.E.2d at 282. The defendant argued that his prior conviction for
“malicious wounding” would obviously create a danger of unfair prejudice given the murder
allegations against him and that the conviction itself bore a remote connection to untruthfulness.
Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. See id. at 390, 584 S.E.2d at 283 (declaring that the defendant’s argument in favor of
balancing convictions under Rule 403 failed to account for the “clearly expressed intent of the
legislature”).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. The hard line adopted by the Brown court failed to consider federal circuit decisions
reading Federal Rule 609 in harmony with Federal Rule 403. Moreover, the court ignored the fact
that the balancing provision found in Rule 609(b) represented a higher standard than that found in
Rule 403. In that sense, it seems apparent that the reason Rule 609(a) includes no balancing
provision is because it may be read in conjunction with Rule 403.
294. Id. (“The language of Rule 609(a) (‘shall be admitted’) is mandatory, leaving no room
for the trial court’s discretion.” (emphasis added)).
295. See, e.g., State v. Blackwell, 276 N.C. 714, 724, 174 S.E.2d 534, 541 (1970) (“Whether
the cross-examination goes too far or is unfair is a matter for determination of the trial judge and
rests largely in his sole discretion.”); Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 271 N.C. 276, 282, 156
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purpose of the rules themselves 297 when concluding that trial courts have no
discretion to exclude convictions with little probative value and a high
degree of misuse. The General Assembly has made no effort to amend Rule
609 in light of Brown’s mandate. Congress, within the same period,
clarified the federal rule to confirm trial court discretion under Rule 403 for
non-crimen falsi felonies.298 In 1999, Federal Rule 609 was amended to add
a degree of protection to an entire class of witnesses, including victims. 299
North Carolina has not budged. Today, North Carolina trial courts are
obliged to uphold Brown’s mandate: the thousands of convictions falling
within Rule 609 must be admitted when offered by counsel,
notwithstanding the unfair prejudice to the witness or impact on the jury’s
decision.
* * *
The initial promise that a comprehensive evidence code would usher
in systematic reform to the state’s impeachment practices has been
dispelled. As drafted, and since interpreted, North Carolina Rule 609
essentially embraces the same broad use of conviction evidence without
regard to the accompanying prejudice, impact, or juror misuse. As a
consequence, individuals subject to the force of open impeachment often
elect not to subject themselves to the indignity imposed by the rule. 300
When applied to victims of domestic and sexual violence, dangerous
defendants reap the benefits; when imposed on wrongly accused persons,
jurors are tacitly permitted to circumvent affirmative proof of guilt.

S.E.2d 265, 270 (1967) (demurring that “the judge is in charge of the trial” and “has plenary
power to protect a witness from harassment and to keep cross-examination within the bounds of
reason” after rejecting limits on conviction-based impeachment and berating other states’ statutes
granting trial court discretion to exclude convictions); State v. King, 224 N.C. 329, 331, 30
S.E.2d 230, 231–33 (1944) (recognizing fifty years before Brown that—even in a broad
impeachment arena—some convictions simply afforded no value in weighing credibility and
therefore should be excluded); State v. Neal, 222 N.C. 547, 547, 23 S.E.2d 911, 912 (1943)
(“[W]hether the cross-examination goes too far or is unfair is a matter for determination of the
trial judge, and rests largely in his sound discretion.” (emphasis added)); State v. Atkinson, 39
N.C. App. 575, 580, 251 S.E.2d 677, 681 (1979).
296. Crumpler & Widenhouse, supra note 235, at 26–27 (“Rule 403, with its independent
requirement that probative value outweigh potential prejudice, should provide the extra measure
of protection against some of the abuses inherent in the use of evidence of other crimes.”).
297. N.C. R. EVID. 102(a) (“These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and
development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined.” (emphases added)).
298. See supra notes 121–25 and accompanying text.
299. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence—Rule 609, 129 F.R.D. 347, 353–54
(1990).
300. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 39, at § 609 app. 100; see infra Section III.C.
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In the next part, this Article reveals the detrimental effect of North
Carolina’s conviction-based impeachment practices by illustrating their
impact on victims of sexual assault and domestic violence. Part III explores
how the state’s adherence to rigid impeachment rules negatively affects
juror decisionmaking, victim trauma, and victim-witness participation in
the judicial system. Thereafter, Part IV proposes a straightforward
amendment for reforming Rule 609 of the North Carolina Rules of
Evidence to curb the harmful outcomes it currently produces.
III. ATTACKING VICTIMS: CHILLING TESTIMONY AND PROMOTING
REVICTIMIZATION
The victim of domestic or sexual violence invariably encounters a
grueling experience when called to testify at trial. She must recount the
horrors inflicted upon her––reliving the events as she tells them in vivid
detail.301 During the process, she is expected to delve into deeply private
concerns.302 Otherwise confidential information about her medical
condition and psychological well-being are laid bare.303 Intimate details
about her body are openly discussed. 304 All of this occurs in a public forum
before a jury comprised of complete strangers. 305
301. H. Hunter Bruton, Cross-Examination, College Sexual-Assault Adjudications, and the
Opportunity for Tuning Up the “Greatest Legal Engine Ever Invented,” 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 145, 177 (2017) (“At trial, the victim must undergo [the assault] trauma again when she
recounts her experience in court.”); Mary Fan, Adversarial Justice’s Casualties: Defending
Victim-Witness Protection, 55 B.C. L. REV. 775, 776 (2014) (“The evidence is mounting that
undergoing rituals of adversarial adjudication retraumatizes victims of violent and sexual assault
crimes.”); Jacqueline St. Joan, Sex, Sense, and Sensibility: Trespassing into the Culture of
Domestic Abuse, 20 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 263, 282 (1997) (describing the difficulty, albeit
critical importance, of domestic violence victims offering rich narratives to persuade judges and
fact-finders).
302. Bruton, supra note 301, at 175 (“Testifying often entails a deep dive into private aspects
of a witness’s life.”); St. Joan, supra note 301, at 298 (noting that trials are punctuated by the
prosecution and defense as a “collection of [the victim’s] bodily functions that become available
for public discourse”).
303. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 330 N.C. 711, 719, 723, 412 S.E.2d 359, 364, 367 (1992)
(holding that the prosecution witness’s prior drug use, suicide attempts, and psychiatric history
were “proper and admissible for purposes of impeachment” because North Carolina “has long
allowed cross-examination regarding the witness’s past mental problems or defects”); Anoosha
Rouhanian, A Call for Change: The Detrimental Impacts of Crawford v. Washington on Domestic
Violence and Rape Prosecutions, 37 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 1, 34 (2017) (detailing the deterrent
effect on victims testifying out of fear of personal records being exposed publicly at trial,
including private counseling records used to cast doubt on the victim’s credibility).
304. Rouhanian, supra note 303, at 25 (noting the myriad reasons assault victims fail to
testify at trial, including “being vulnerable to questioning on highly personal and sensitive
topics”).
305. Ponce v. State, 901 S.W.2d 537, 541 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1995, no pet.) (noting the
trauma imposed on the victim of sexual violence who is “forced to recount the entire ordeal for all
and sundry in open court”).
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The victim-witness must then endure the “crucible” of crossexamination. 306 Her testimony is given in the presence of the very person
she alleges committed the violent acts––making the experience all the more
daunting and traumatic. 307 She often shoulders the burden as the primary
witness in the prosecution’s case. Unlike other crimes where forensic
evidence, video surveillance, and third-party witnesses abound, domestic
abuse and sexual assaults routinely lack corroborating evidence. 308 Most
involve a single victim who has little more to offer than her own account. 309
Consequently, the victim-witness’s credibility often becomes the central
focus of the trial. 310
Defense counsel frequently elect to “try the victim” when the
government’s success or failure in convicting the assailant turns on the
victim-witness’s credibility. 311 When this tactic is employed, the focus of
306. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (holding that the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee of confrontation “commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be
assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination” (emphasis
added)).
307. Id. (holding that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the procedural right to confront
accusers through cross-examination); Fan, supra note 301, at 788 (“From just a simple lunge
away, victims are required to testify and have their credibility judged, tested, and challenged on
cross-examination.”). See generally Rouhanian, supra note 303, at 22–36 (detailing the
deleterious effects of confrontation by cross-examination on victims of domestic and sexual
violence).
308. Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for
Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 370–71 (1996) (observing that the
prosecutorial problems unique to domestic violence cases include the lack of third-party
witnesses and physical evidence because attacks tend to occur at home and victims often refuse or
delay medical treatment); Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV.
747, 771 (2005) [hereinafter Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers] (“The physical evidence in a
domestic violence case is often scant, and it is susceptible to many different explanations.”).
309. Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers Accountable for Silencing Their
Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857, 870 (2009) [hereinafter Lininger, Holding Batterers Accountable]
(observing the difficulty prosecutors experience in proving domestic assault cases because the
event typically involves only two witnesses).
310. People v. Griffin, 242 A.D.2d 70, 74 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (noting that where no other
witnesses are available, “the credibility of the two people involved [is] the paramount issue for
the jury to resolve”); Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1353, 1361 (2005)
[hereinafter Lininger, Bearing the Cross] (“In most prosecutions of domestic violence or sexual
assault, the key question is whether the jury believes the accuser’s or the defendant’s versions of
the facts.”); Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in Rape
Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 663, 679–81 (1998); see St. Joan, supra note 301, at 304 (“The
credibility factor is particularly crucial in cases involving domestic violence, because there are
often no other witnesses.”).
311. Galloway v. State, 122 So. 3d 614, 668 (Miss. 2013) (upholding the trial court’s decision
to prohibit defense counsel from revealing the victim’s sexual preferences as an improper attempt
to inflame the jury into trying the victim rather than the accused); Lininger, Bearing the Cross,
supra note 310, at 1378–79 (noting that the tactics employed by Kobe Bryant’s legal defense
team in attacking the victim who alleged Bryant had raped her confirmed for men and defense
attorneys that the “strategy of ‘trying the accuser’ pays big dividends in a rape prosecution”).
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the trial shifts away from the violent event and onto the victim herself. 312
She is subjected to a barrage of questions about her sexual history, mental
health, alcohol use, manner of dress, social interactions, and past crimes. 313
These forays are designed to discredit her by pandering to juror
misconceptions about sexual assault and negative stereotypes concerning
domestic violence. 314 At the same time, they have the effect of harassing,
embarrassing, and emotionally traumatizing the victim-witness.315
The victim-witness’s trial experience is worsened further when crossexamination confirms the victim’s fear that testifying will expose her to
personal castigation.316 Those fears are realized when defense counsel
elects to impeach her as a witness unworthy of belief. 317 While rape-shield
statutes protect some victims from character assaults, 318 impeaching a
victim-witness with her prior convictions remains a powerful weapon for

312. Bruton, supra note 301, at 174–78 (describing the strategy of turning trials into attacks
on the victim by focusing on the victim’s past behavior under the auspices of consent); Lininger,
Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1355 (“In a ‘he said, she said’ contest, the defendant will
naturally attempt to shift the focus from his own conduct to the foibles of the alleged victim.”).
313. Kennard v. State, 349 S.E.2d 470, 471 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that defense
counsel’s evidence of the victim’s prior drug and alcohol treatment was correctly “excluded as
irrelevant and as improperly tending to ‘blacken’ the victim’s character”); Orenstein, supra note
310, at 680–82 (detailing the sexist belief that women are somehow blameworthy for being
assaulted based on their behavior, reputation, and decisionmaking).
314. Wood v. State, 957 F.2d 1544, 1552–53 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing the likelihood that
jurors may be influenced by notions of morality and proper conduct); Bruton, supra note 301, at
177 (detailing how defense counsel utilize juror stereotypes and misconceptions about abuse in
their efforts to achieve acquittals in sexual assault and domestic violence cases); Orenstein, supra
note 310, at 681 (“Abundant evidence from psychology experiments indicates that various rape
myths and other sexist stereotypes play a vital role in determining whether and how much the
victim is held responsible.”).
315. See, e.g., Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 583 (6th Cir. 2018) (conceding that crossexamination can have a harmful, harassing impact on the victim); Wood, 957 F.2d at 1552 (noting
that sexual assault victims are disincentivized from reporting crimes against them out of fear of
facing harassing questions and having their private lives made public at trial).
316. Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1357 (“As a general matter, victims’
willingness to report crimes varies inversely with their fear of embarrassment during crossexamination.”).
317. Certainly, many criminal defense lawyers avoid harsh cross-examination tactics and are
keenly aware of the danger that comes with unnecessarily attacking the victim. In North Carolina,
the rule itself may force defense counsel’s hand where one’s client has a criminal history that will
be used against him if he testifies. In that scenario, it is conceivable that defense counsel will
impeach the victim with her prior convictions to equalize the impact such evidence may have at
trial.
318. Fan, supra note 301, at 787 (noting that, although victim protection statutes safeguard
some victims—primarily sexual but not domestic assault victims—from personal character
assaults, they leave open other avenues for credibility attacks). Today, rape-shield statutes
prohibit most of the insidious attacks formerly utilized to expose the victim’s personal sexual
behavior. However, these statutes—including North Carolina’s own—are limited in nature and do
not inhibit general attacks on the witness’s prior misdeeds. See N.C. R. EVID. 412.
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attacking her personally. 319 When this tactic is employed, the victim labors
under the additional burden of having her criminal record turned against
her. In these situations, the victim understandably feels that she, as opposed
to the defendant, is on trial.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, victim-witnesses are largely
shielded from defense counsel attacks with prior-conviction evidence. The
types of crimes available for impeaching a witness’s general character for
untruthfulness are limited. 320 And the trial court is empowered to exclude
those convictions with scant probative value but which risk unfairly
marring the victim in the eyes of the jury. 321 Victim-witnesses in North
Carolina are afforded no similar protection. As this Article reveals, the
state’s impeachment practices widely permit exposing a witness’s prior
criminal misdeeds. 322 Few crimes fall outside the credibility-attack ambit.323
Trial courts lack any discretion to prevent general character attacks aimed
at revealing prior criminal foibles. 324 When the witness has no personal
stake in the outcome, North Carolina’s impeachment policies may be
humiliating, but not harmful. But when the witness is the victim, the state’s
broad embrace of attacking witness credibility has far greater implications.
As detailed below, North Carolina conviction-based impeachment
practices impact negatively juror decisionmaking by perpetuating assault
stereotypes, foster revictimization trauma on victim-witnesses, and impede
societal interests in criminal accountability by depressing victim
participation in the judicial system.
A.

Juror Influence: Promoting Harmful Stereotypes

North Carolina’s broad approach to impeaching a witness’s credibility
with prior-conviction evidence offers defense counsel an open avenue for
pandering to juror stereotypes. Unlike most criminal cases, jurors may
harbor a general distrust of victims who allege sexual assault and domestic

319. See, e.g., In re Ferguson, 487 P.2d 1234, 1240 (Cal. 1971) (in bank) (concluding that
defense counsel’s need to attack the victim-witness’s credibility is heightened when the defendant
claims innocence and the victim has prior convictions).
320. FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (limiting conviction-based impeachment to felonies and crimes
involving an element of falsity while excluding all misdemeanors unrelated to truthfulness).
321. Id. For non-defendant-witnesses such as victims, trial courts are empowered to exercise
their broad discretion granted under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to protect victim-witnesses
against character attacks with criminal convictions that have little probative value when weighed
against the danger they will unfairly prejudice the witness or trial. Id.; FED. R. EVID. 403.
322. See supra Section II.C.
323. See supra Section II.E. (noting over two thousand crimes, including the vast majority of
misdemeanors, available to impeach North Carolina witnesses).
324. See supra Section II.D.
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violence.325 This distrust often derives from long-standing myths
surrounding domestic abuse and sexual assault. Many jurors adhere to
domestic violence myths that family violence is rare or somehow invited by
the victim’s actions. 326 Some conform to antiquated notions that domestic
violence is a personal, family matter that should remain private. 327 Cultural
myths surrounding sexual assault continue to plague prosecution of these
offenses as well. 328 Jurors prefer to believe rape rarely occurs. 329 They
incorrectly assume sexual assault is “wildly aberrational,” only happening
at the hands of a stranger who violently attacks an unknown victim who
placed herself in the wrong place at the wrong time.330 They therefore tend
to focus primarily on the victim and her actions, especially when sexual
assault is perpetrated by an acquaintance. 331 Where the victim is less than
the ideal image jurors associate with an “innocent” victim, jurors may be
less likely to believe the victim is a victim at all. 332
Professor Aviva Orenstein, a noted social justice scholar, aptly
describes the cultural rape myth:
[A] heroine—young, attractive, respectable—who has been brutally
attacked and raped despite fierce resistance. At the time of the rape,
she is modestly dressed and where she is supposed to be. She has no
promiscuous past or lascivious inclinations. Thus, she has also done
nothing, be it seductive or incautious to “invite” the violent attack.
She reports this violation immediately. The anti-hero of this fable is
325. Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1360 (observing that some jurors and
judges simply believe victims “fabricate” sexual assault claims); Rouhanian, supra note 303, at
36 (“There is a national, ‘widespread perception’ amongst the public that rape victims lie about
their assaults.”); Christina M. Tchen, Rape Reform and a Statutory Consent Defense, 74 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1518, 1520–22 (1983) (detailing the extensive history of the legal system’s
distrust of rape complainants).
326. De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 372–73 (observing that jurors may prefer believing that
domestic abuse is rare or subscribe to domestic violence myths including, “she likes the abuse, it
is her own fault for not leaving, she shouldn’t be airing her personal problems in public, etc.”).
327. Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1360 (“Some jurors and judges believe
that domestic violence is a natural occurrence in families . . . .”).
328. Id. at 1360; Orenstein, supra note 310, at 677–78; Rouhanian, supra note 303, at 37–39.
329. See De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 371–72 (explaining that juror “belief in a just world”
predisposes jurors to think the assault did not occur or was the result of the victim’s own actions);
Orenstein, supra note 310, at 676 (describing the common view of rape as “exceptional or
unusual” as a form of cultural denial).
330. Orenstein, supra note 310, at 676.
331. Id. at 679–80 (noting that distrust of rape victims leads jurors to focus on victims’
motives and mores).
332. Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1360 (explaining that “sexist
stereotypes” dominate judge and juror assumptions about whether domestic violence or sexual
assault occurred or, worse, whether it was invited); Orenstein, supra note 310, at 682 (explaining
the “rape myth” and how deviation from juror expectations of rape, victim response, and victim
behavior “may prompt juries to believe that no rape occurred or that the incident was the victim’s
fault”).
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the brutish male aggressor. He is a sex-crazed, deviant sociopath. He
has no previous acquaintance with the victim. He is violent and
sadistic, using extreme force to violate his victim. He is a “loser”
who has no girlfriend. 333
The perpetual myths surrounding domestic violence and sexual assault
play a significant role in juror stereotypes of victim and aggressor
behavior.334 Jurors are more likely to cast blame on a woman who engages
in behavior they believe somehow helped facilitate the assault. 335 Survivors
are scrutinized for their actions––how much they had to drink, what they
wore, how they acted, who they were with, what they said, etc. 336 When a
victim deviates from juror prototypes of the “innocent” victim, jurors
become less inclined to convict. 337 As a result, the law rewards defense
counsel efforts to portray the victim in a negative light as it permits attacks
on the victim’s character through evidence of prior convictions, especially
for crimes that jurors may view as immoral or risky. 338
Consider the following hypothetical modeled on recent campus sexual
assault cases from California, 339 Ohio,340 and Texas341:
A twenty-year-old college student attends a fraternity party. Despite
being under the legal drinking age, she is served alcohol in fruit
punch drinks. As the evening progresses, one of the fraternity
members approaches and begins talking to her. She is later seen
leaving his room in the predawn hours the following morning. A ride
service drops her off at the hospital. She tells the intake nurse she
333. Orenstein, supra note 310, at 677–78.
334. Id. at 678–84 (“The traditional image of a rapist as a ‘knife wielding maniac unknown to
his attacker’ is simply false.”).
335. De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 372–73; Orenstein, supra note 310, at 684–86.
336. Bruton, supra note 301, at 176–77.
337. See Orenstein, supra note 310, at 684–86 (describing the rape paradigm and its negative
impact on police, prosecutors, and jurors who simply fail to believe the victim when she does not
conform to the paradigm’s constructs).
338. See generally Bruton, supra note 301, at 176–78 (describing defense counsel attempts to
exculpate defendants by pandering to juror stereotypes about victim behavior); Orenstein, supra
note 310, at 685–86 (detailing defense counsel attacks on victims’ “so-called contributory
negligence and other non-traditional behaviors”). Prostitution, public indecency, and other
morality-based crimes may pander to juror expectations of moral decency and invite antiquated
assumptions about victim behavior bearing on consent.
339. People v. Turner, No. H043709, 2018 WL 3751731, at *1–3 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug 8,
2018); Liam Stack, Light Sentence for Brock Turner in Stanford Rape Case Draws Outrage, N.Y.
TIMES (June 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/07/us/outrage-in-stanford-rape-caseover-dueling-statements-of-victim-and-attackers-father.html [https://perma.cc/55U4-J8VB (dark
archive)].
340. Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 578–80 (6th Cir. 2018).
341. No Jail Time for Ex-Baylor Fraternity President Accused of Rape, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 11,
2018),
https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-baylor-frat-rape-accusation-20181211-story.html
[https://perma.cc/EB8W-4JXD].
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has been sexually assaulted. Medical providers perform a rape test
to collect DNA. She later tells investigators about the night prior.
She recalls being given several drinks at the party. She says the last
drink she was given caused her to become disoriented and ill. A male
individual she met earlier led her through the fraternity house to his
room, telling her she could rest until she felt better. Once inside, he
sexually assaulted her—taking advantage of her incapacitated state.
Forensic analysis confirms that the DNA taken from the victim
matches the fraternity member. The defendant readily admits to the
sexual encounter. He simply says it was consensual. He claims the
victim asked him to take her to his room and, although she was
intoxicated, fully consented to the sexual encounter. Nobody else was
present at the time. Witnesses at the party indicate the victim had
been drinking and recall the defendant offering her a place to sleep
for the night. Some indicate the victim was in no condition to make
informed decisions and was saying she needed to lie down.
Prosecutors bring sexual assault charges against the fraternity
member based on the victim’s allegations, DNA evidence, and
witness accounts. The case proceeds to trial.
Let us pause at this juncture. The case is antithetical to the traditional
sexual assault myth most jurors likely accept about “stranger” rapists. The
assailant is not a violent sociopath using extreme force on an unknown
victim. This example does, though, represent the most common form of
sexual assault. In the majority of cases, the victim is acquainted with her
assailant.342 Thus, from the outset, prosecutors will have to educate
prospective jurors about rape realities during jury selection. 343 At trial, they
may need to call an expert witness to deconstruct the rape myth for jurors
while explaining how sexual assault occurs in our society predominately at
the hands of acquaintances and intimate partners.344
The facts present another impediment to prosecution germane to this
analysis. Because people prefer to assume they live in a world where sexual
violence does not occur, jurors are predisposed to scrutinizing the victim
when her behavior falls outside of the “innocent” victim model jurors

342. Sexual Assault in the United States, NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RESOURCE CTR.,
www.nsvrc.org/statistics [https://perma.cc/P7GE-XXVP] (indicating that 51.1% of female
victims of rape reported being raped by an intimate partner and 40.8% by an acquaintance).
343. Christopher Mallios & Toolsi Meisner, Educating Juries in Sexual Assault Cases Part I:
Using Voir Dire to Eliminate Jury Bias, STRATEGIES 2–6 (July 2012),
http://www.ncdsv.org/images/AEquitas_EducatingJuriesInSexualAssaultCasesPart1_7-2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/68LJ-TYSL].
344. Orenstein, supra note 310, at 701–11 (discussing the use of experts to educate juries on
rape trauma syndrome and the domestic violence paradigm).
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expect.345 The more jurors perceive that the victim engaged in risk-taking
behavior, the more likely they are to assign blame to the victim by applying
“assumption-of-the-risk” logic.346
Capitalizing on juror aversion to victims who engage in risk-taking
activities, such as drug or alcohol use, one can imagine defense counsel’s
cross-examination proceeding in part as follows:
Q: You went to the fraternity party?
A: I did.
Q: You had an alcoholic drink?
A: Someone gave me a drink.
Q: You took it, right?
A: Yes.
Q: Even though you were under twenty-one years old?
A: They were handing them out.
Q: Is that a “yes?”
A: Yes . . .
Q: And then you had another drink?
A: Yes.
Q: And then another?
A: Umm, yeah . . .347
Victim cross-examination often focuses on the victim’s actions
preceding the assault to elicit questions about the victim’s memory,
mannerisms, and behavior.348 All of these are aimed at attacking her
345. De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 371–72.
346. Orenstein, supra note 310, at 685–86 (describing permissible attacks on victims not
excluded by rape shield statutes that pander to juror stereotypes that the victim somehow
contributed to her attack by her risk-taking); Cassia Spohn & David Holleran, Prosecuting Sexual
Assault: A Comparison of Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases Involving Strangers,
Acquaintances, and Intimate Partners, 18 JUST. Q. 652, 672–73 (2001) (analyzing empirical data
to conclude that victim risk-taking and reputation play a significant role in prosecutor decisions to
charge based on their expectations of success at trial).
347. See generally Eleanor W. Myers & Edward D. Ohlbaum, Discrediting the Truthful
Witness: Demonstrating the Reality of Adversary Advocacy, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1055, 1060
(2000) (demonstrating the impact of cross-examining the “truthful” assault victim with evidence
of victim behavior occurring prior to the assault).
348. Sara D. Schotland, Rape Victims as Mockingbirds: A Law and Linguistics Analysis of
Cross-Examination of Rape Complainants, 19 BUFF. J. GENDER, L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 25 (2011)
(“Inevitably, cross-examinations in rape cases paint the rape complainant as someone who is lax
in her dating behavior, loose in her morals, or otherwise ‘wanted it.’” (quoting GREGORY M.
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credibility and raising the question of whether the victim consented to the
sexual encounter as alleged by the defendant. 349 In these situations, the
victim-witness is subject to attack on the very stereotypes that jurors likely
possess: sexual assault happens in one way and victims are “responsible”
for their own risky choices.
Let us now move our hypothetical case into a North Carolina state
superior court and consider the exacerbating effect criminal-conviction
evidence has on exploiting juror stereotypes about sexual assault and
victim behavior:
Knowing the victim must testify, defense counsel begins preparing
for cross-examination. Private investigators have revealed the
victim’s past run-ins with the law. Her indiscretions appear useful to
the defense as it builds the case against her: a Class 2 misdemeanor
for possession of alcohol as an eighteen-year-old350 in high school
followed by a Class 2 misdemeanor disorderly conduct offense351
after a concert the summer before college. During her freshman
year, a resident assistant discovered drug paraphernalia in her dorm
room, resulting in another Class 1 misdemeanor.352
Armed with the victim’s criminal record, defense counsel begins
crafting cross-examination. Counsel intends to discredit her by
revealing to the jury all of her prior encounters with the law. The
stated purpose will be to question her character for truthfulness.
Subtly, however, counsel plans on using these indiscretions to
suggest she has a character for “wild, reckless behavior” and is a
“party girl” who consented to the sexual encounter with the
defendant the night of the fraternity party.
The Federal Rules of Evidence and jurisdictions hewing closely
thereto would proscribe the cross-examination contemplated in this
hypothetical case353 and force defense counsel to pursue another line of
questioning. The convictions are not felonies, nor are they misdemeanors
MATOESIAN, REPRODUCING R APE: DOMINATION T HROUGH T ALK IN THE COURTROOM 222
(William M. O’Barr & John M. Conley eds., 1993))).
349. David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship:
A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1028 (1990) (“To make it seem plausible
that the victim consented and then turned around and charged rape, the lawyer must play to the
jurors’ deeply rooted cultural fantasies about feminine sexual voracity and vengefulness.”);
Schotland, supra note 348, at 25.
350. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-302(b)(1) (2017).
351. See id. § 14-288.4.
352. See id. § 90-113.22(a).
353. FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (strictly limiting conviction-based impeachment to felonies and
crimes involving an element of falsity while excluding all misdemeanors unrelated to
truthfulness).
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that require proving dishonesty or false statement as an element. 354 None
remotely correlates to untruthfulness. 355
The convictions are not, however, divorced from what jurors may
perceive as risk-taking activities demonstrating poor judgment or, worse,
immoral behavior. 356 And that is the very sentiment defense counsel seeks
to exploit.357 Directly attacking the victim-witness as a “party girl” or a
person with a “wild, reckless character” through evidence of prior acts of
drinking, disorderly conduct, or drug use is off limits, even in North
Carolina.358 Indirectly, however, defense counsel is afforded a clear path to
circumvent prohibitions on character assaults given the mandatory
admission of her convictions under North Carolina Rule 609(a). 359 When
the victim’s criminal history aligns with risk-taking activities, defense
counsel can openly impugn the victim’s moral character under the auspices
of attacking her credibility.
North Carolina’s permissive approach to conviction-based
impeachment tacitly encourages exploiting juror beliefs about victim
behavior and perpetuates insidious cultural stereotypes about domestic
violence and sexual assault. Where a victim’s criminal convictions
correlate to immoral or risky behavior, jurors are more likely to succumb to
false myths. At the same time, juror focus is directed away from the
defendant’s guilt or innocence and onto the victim herself.
This deleterious effect on juror decisionmaking alone is sufficient
cause for reforming North Carolina Rule 609(a). It is not, however, the sole
reason.

354. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-288.4, 18B-302(b)(1), 90-113.22(a) (2017).
355. See, e.g., State v. Pickens, No. W2015-00368-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 9581393, at *4–5
(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 29, 2015) (concluding that the sexual assault victim’s prior convictions in
North Carolina for possession of cocaine and marijuana were not felonies nor crimes of
dishonesty and were therefore properly excluded by the trial court).
356. Wood v. Alaska, 957 F.2d 1544, 1552–53 (9th Cir. 1992) (observing that jurors are
influenced by moral constructs that negatively impact their decisionmaking if the victim’s
behavior does not conform thereto); Bruton, supra note 301, at 176–77; Orenstein, supra note
310, at 683–84 (discussing juror feelings about victim behavior and their sense that the victim
may have “invited” the assault by her actions).
357. Bruton, supra note 301, at 175 (observing that “creative cross-examiners can devise
subtle subterfuge to elicit the same information [about impermissible topics] or make the same
insinuations through permissible questioning”).
358. See, e.g., N.C. R. EVID. 404 (excluding prior acts of a person to prove his or her
character, including victim traits not pertinent to the case issues); Dunton v. State, 453 S.E.2d
800, 801 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (“[W]hether the victim used drugs in the past or was generally
knowledgeable about illegal drugs is irrelevant to the issue of whether [the defendant] committed
the offenses of rape and kidnapping. Rape is no more lawful when committed against a woman
who uses cocaine than it is against one who does not use cocaine.”).
359. State v. Brown, 357 N.C. 382, 390, 584 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2003) (holding that Rule
609(a) affords “no room for the trial court’s discretion”).
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Victim Trauma: Enhancing Revictimization

North Carolina’s permissive approach to impeaching witnesses with
prior-conviction evidence also enhances the revictimization effect
experienced by victim-witnesses. Revictimization is an accepted byproduct
of the adversarial system for assault victims who brave testifying. 360 The
victim suffers at least two and, depending on the cross-examination tactics
employed, potentially three traumatic events. 361 First, the victim suffers the
trauma of the assault and the resultant physical and psychological
injuries.362 If she reports the attack, she next endures the ordeal of evidence
collection, investigative inquiry, and public disclosure. 363 Finally, if she
proceeds with assisting the prosecution, she must confront her alleged
assailant and succumb to a cross-examination often aimed at discrediting
her story by attacking her character. 364
Cross-examination is confrontational by design. The American justice
system reveres face-to-face confrontation through cross-examination as
indispensable to truth-finding.365 The adversarial process therefore
condones aggressive cross-examination of witnesses as part and parcel of
the trial system. 366 Understandably, given the due process rights of the
defendant and the life and liberty interests at stake, victim-witnesses are
equally as subject to the rigors of cross-examination as any other witness.
The impact, however, is dissimilar. The neighbor who sees a domestic
assault through her window and later recounts what she witnessed in court
is subject to cross-examination. The same is true for the woman who
survived the attack. The personal impact of cross-examination on these
witnesses, however, is profoundly disparate. The neighbor is not
susceptible to revictimization. She has not been victimized in the first
instance.
360. Bruton, supra note 301, at 178 (describing the victim trial experience and observing that
“[e]ven when a favorable outcome occurs, the trauma inflicted by the trial can contribute to
lasting psychological injury”); see also Fan, supra note 301, at 783–92 (explaining how the
adversarial criminal justice process worsens post-traumatic stress and causes victims pain);
Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1359–60; Rouhanian, supra note 303, at 43–44.
361. Bruton, supra note 301, at 176–77; Schotland, supra note 348, at 25.
362. Bruton, supra note 301, at 176–77; Orenstein, supra note 310, at 674.
363. Myka Held, A Constitutional Remedy for Sexual Assault Survivors, 16 GEO. J. GENDER
& L. 445, 447–52 (2015) (detailing revictimization at the hands of investigators and prosecutors
entrenched in cultural rape myths and victim stereotyping); Orenstein, supra note 310, at 682
(noting that when a victim reports an assault she is “measured by everyone” including “friends,
police, prosecutors, and . . . jurors”).
364. Fan, supra note 301, at 790–92; see Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at
1359–60; Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers, supra note 308, at 772.
365. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–62 (2004) (proclaiming that adversarial
testing through cross-examination “beats and bolts out the Truth much better” (quoting
MATTHEW H ALE, HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON L AW OF ENGLAND 258 (1713))).
366. Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers, supra note 308, at 772.
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The assault victim absorbs the impact of cross-examination
personally, even under the best of circumstances. 367 Where crossexamination questions are directed toward exposing the witness’s faulty
perception, biases, and motivations, they are permissible, albeit
traumatic.368 The victim must relive the events as told through the narrow
constructs the cross-examiner seeks to reveal. 369 For example, defense
counsel commonly use variances in her account to suggest she cannot be
trusted.370 To the victim, this can feel like her story is being twisted or
inconsistencies exaggerated, elevating her sense of self-blame.371 When
cross-examination questions veer away from her story and into her
lifestyle, the victim’s trial trauma elevates. 372 She encounters a personal
assault as questions chip away at her behavior, manner of dress,
decisionmaking, speech, memory, and other individual concerns.373
Revictimization trauma is inevitable at this point. Regrettably, for a North
Carolina victim with a prior criminal record, revictimization trauma is not
yet complete.
In our prior hypothetical, we analyzed a college sexual assault case by
contemplating the negative effect the victim’s criminal record may have on
jurors. We did not then examine the impact on the victim-witness herself. It
cannot be ignored. Let us now consider how revictimization trauma
escalates when prior crimes are used as additional cross-examination
fodder to attack the victim’s credibility.
Exposing the victim’s past crimes to impugn her credibility, defense
counsel’s cross-examination continues as follows:
Q: This isn’t your first time in the court system is it?
A: Excuse me?
Q: You have had trouble following the law, haven’t you?
A: I don’t think that’s fair, no.
367. Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 583 (6th Cir. 2018) (observing that cross-examination can
have a harmful, harassing impact on the victim).
368. See Orenstein, supra note 310, at 679.
369. Bruton, supra note 301, at 164 (“Many advocates use cross-examination more to trap
witnesses than to add information.”).
370. Id. at 165 (observing how cross-examination can mislead the victim-witness into
changing her truthful story); De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 373 (“Jurors may assume a ‘real’
victim would remember the details of her abuse, and may interpret a partial memory as evidence
that the victim is lying.”).
371. See generally Fan, supra note 301, at 785–86, 788–90 (detailing the circumstances under
which victims are retraumatized and experience PTSD triggers during the adversarial process).
372. Id.; Schotland, supra note 348, at 28.
373. Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1361 (describing such questions as
“tantamount to public psychoanalysis”); Orenstein, supra note 310, at 681–82 (describing blame
tactics employed through personal attacks on the victim).
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Q: You received your first misdemeanor in high school?
A: I got caught with a beer. I wasn’t the only one.
Q: Is that a “yes” to my question?
A: Yes . . .
Q: You later received a second misdemeanor?
A: Yes.
Q: The summer before enrolling in college?
A: Yes.
Q: That was for disorderly conduct?
A: Yes.
Q: After attending a concert?
A: Yes, it was stupid . . .
Q: Your first year in college you were guilty of another?
A: I made a dumb mistake.
Q: My question is whether you received a third conviction?
A: Yes.
Q: This time for drug paraphernalia?
A: Yes . . .
As the victim experiences a cross-examination bent on discrediting
her with her criminal past, revictimization trauma is inevitable. Do the
victim’s underage alcohol possession, disorderly conduct, or drug
paraphernalia misdemeanors correspond to her lying about being sexually
assaulted? Not unless one continues to accept Justice Holmes’s
unsubstantiated claim that a person who commits any crime is prepared to
commit further “evil” by lying on the witness stand. 374 None of these
crimes remotely corresponds to witness untruthfulness. Their primary value
is to dehumanize rather than discredit the victim-witness. Whether
intentional or not, attacking the victim with innocuous convictions
embarrasses and demeans her personally. And yet North Carolina
impeachment practice openly condones it.

374. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
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The corresponding result is a defendant who may reap the windfall of
revictimizing the victim-witness.375 It is a simple reality of the system the
state has adopted. Defendants and defense counsel alike increasingly
recognize the dilemma for the victim. 376 If she testifies against her assailant,
he will have the opportunity to confront her through his attorney or
personally if he elects self-representation. 377 The prospect of confrontation
alone may cause her to withdraw from prosecution. If not, revictimization
tactics—like those encouraged by broad impeachment practices—may play
out in the defendant’s favor. If she responds angrily to questions aimed at
assailing her character, jurors may be less sympathetic to her. 378 If she
retreats into herself, jurors may view her as less credible. 379 However the
jury is influenced, the corollary effect is to further traumatize the victim.
North Carolina Rule 609 promotes systemic revictimization by
permitting victim impeachment with an array of crimes that assails her
personal, rather than truthful, character. The state’s courts then implicitly
accept revictimization as a byproduct of impeachment by denouncing
discretion to exclude crimes falling within the rule’s wide net. 380
Paradoxically, North Carolina Rule 609 is based on the dubious theory that
a crime that enhances punishment also impugns credibility.381 Yet when
employed against victim-witnesses, the rule itself punishes them through
senseless revictimization. For the victim, suffering violence at the hands of
her attacker is the first injury. Publicly recounting her attack is a second.
Being castigated as a liar with her prior criminal record is one more trauma
needlessly imposed on the survivor by the justice system.
C.

Societal Harm: Deterring Victim Participation

North Carolina Rule 609 perverts justice further by chilling victimwitness participation in the very system it means to protect.
Understandably, public embarrassment ranks among the primary fears

375. Fan, supra note 301, at 788–91 (observing that some defense counsel use confrontation
to intentionally revictimize victims and that prosecutors may dismiss or offer pleas to lesser
charges to protect victims from additional trauma imposed by heavy-handed cross-examination
tactics).
376. Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1366.
377. Id. at 1360 (“Some accusers may perceive cross-examination by the defense as yet
another attack by the defendant (through the proxy of defense counsel).”).
378. De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 373; Luban, supra note 349, at 1028 (noting that when
defense counsel pursues questioning that humiliates the victim she may “blow[] up” or retreat
inside herself emotionally and, in doing either, lose credibility as a victim).
379. DeSanctis, supra note 308, at 373; Luban, supra note 349, at 1028.
380. See supra notes 282–299 and accompanying text.
381. See supra Section II.C.
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victims express about cooperating in the prosecution of their assailants.382
Those fears are confirmed when evidence rules encourage attacking the
victim with her prior convictions. North Carolina Rule 609 effectively tells
victim-witnesses with criminal pasts they can expect to be humiliated with
their criminal record.383 As a consequence, victim-witnesses who possess
criminal records may retreat from prosecution altogether rather than endure
public degradation. 384 When they do, the very purpose of the justice system
is derailed.385
Victim participation and successful prosecution are interdependent.
The justice system relies on victims to actively cooperate throughout the
process.386 Many, though, avoid the justice system entirely or elect to
abandon it.387 Surveys indicate that domestic violence victims forgo
participation in the alleged assailant’s prosecution in eighty-five to ninety
percent of cases.388 Sexual assault survivors disavow the judicial process
from the outset by vastly underreporting their assaults. 389 When they do
come forward, many choose later to opt out of prosecution.390 There are
manifold reasons in both cases. Notably, the fear of cross-examination is a
uniform factor for withdrawal by domestic and sexual violence victims.391
To appreciate how impeachment practices additionally contribute to the
victim’s decision to withdraw from prosecution requires a brief discussion
of the paradigms unique to both types of survivors.
382. See Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1357 (observing that “victims’
willingness to report crimes varies inversely with their fear of embarrassment during crossexamination”).
383. The rule broadly applies to the vast majority of crimes without correlation to untruthful
acts, thus enabling defense counsel to question victim-witnesses about innocuous prior
convictions under the auspices of challenging credibility. Moreover, as interpreted, trial courts
lack discretion to curb the harmful effect on the witness—even when revealing her prior crimes
would be unfairly prejudicial. See supra Section II.E.
384. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 39, § 609 app. 100, at 18 (“Fear of public degradation
may make the possessors of a criminal record reluctant to testify, or even to complain of criminal
acts directed against them, to the detriment of the judicial system’s interest in obtaining useful
testimony.”).
385. Id.
386. De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 367; Lininger, Holding Batterers Accountable, supra note
309, at 870–71 (describing the indispensability of domestic assault victims to prosecution).
387. Lininger, Holding Batterers Accountable, supra note 309, at 868–71 (observing that the
vast majority of victims eventually recant, refuse to testify, or fail to appear at trial).
388. De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 367; Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers, supra note 308, at
768.
389. Sexual assault remains the most underreported crime in the nation with sixty-three
percent of sexual violence not being reported to police. Sexual Assault in the United States, supra
note 342.
390. Fan, supra note 301, at 785–88 (noting studies demonstrating severe victim
dissatisfaction with the judicial system and how the adversarial process discourages victims from
participation).
391. Bruton, supra note 301, at 178; Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1357–58.
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In domestic cases, violence is one part of a complex cycle
characterized by three distinct phases. 392 In the tension-building phase, the
victim commonly experiences psychological abuse targeting her selfesteem.393 This period eventually crescendos into the violence phase where
she is physically assaulted. 394 The third “honeymoon” phase is
characterized by the assailant expressing remorse while seeking
reconciliation.395 Most efforts to prosecute the assailant are frustrated by the
effect of the honeymoon phase on the victim. 396 Domestic violence victims
who do not succumb to its effects, however, face other impediments to
assisting prosecution. They must overcome reprisal threats from the
assailants, public scrutiny, confrontation with their abusers, and targeted
cross-examination tactics.397
Sexual assault victims experience their own distinct psychological
trauma that impacts their willingness to cooperate in prosecuting their
perpetrators. The violation to the victim’s autonomy imposes a deep sense
of personal vulnerability. 398 She may experience feelings of weakness, loss
of control, and fear.399 Most survivors are also plagued by deep distrust. 400
Their victimization leads not only to distrusting the assailant but also
infects their faith in society as a whole. 401 The severe psychological trauma
inflicted on the sexual assault survivor represents a significant impediment
to her participation in the judicial process.
The psychological disincentives for victims of domestic and sexual
assault to confront their assailants are valid. The judicial system itself
should not exacerbate them. Yet, systemic impediments that cause victims
to abandon the process abound. Domestic violence victims may encounter
unsympathetic police grown weary from responding to the repeated
cycle.402 They may have to work in tandem with prosecutors frustrated by

392. St. Joan, supra note 301, at 274.
393. De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 369 (explaining how victim cooperation directly
correlates to the cycle of violence); Jennice Vilhauer, Understanding the Victim: A Guide to Aid
in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953, 954–55 (2000)
(chronicling the cycles of domestic violence and their effect on prosecuting assailants).
394. De Sanctis, supra note 308 at 369; Vilhauer, supra note 393, at 954.
395. De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 369; Vilhauer, supra note 393, at 955.
396. De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 369–70; Rouhanian, supra note 303, at 33 (noting that the
honeymoon phase is characterized by domestic violence survivors experiencing hope that
reconciliation is real, believing their abusers will transform their lives).
397. See De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 368–74; St. Joan, supra note 301, at 298; Vilhauer,
supra note 393, at 958–59.
398. Rouhanian, supra note 303, at 33.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. See De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 371; Rouhanian, supra note 303, at 27.
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the victim’s reluctance. 403 In some cases, domestic violence victims
experience judges who are intolerant of the victim who, in their view, has
continued to put herself in harm’s way. 404
Meanwhile, sexual assault victims must endure the realities of the
proof process. They often undergo invasive tests to collect forensic
evidence.405 Investigators probe their stories in excruciating detail by
delving into deeply personal aspects of their bodies, lives, and health. 406
And, of course, the adversarial system commands that victims directly
confront their assailants.407
Victim reluctance with assisting prosecution is unnecessarily
heightened, however, when evidence rules open avenues for personal
attacks in the courtroom. 408 Today, the fear of cross-examination ranks
among the key structural impediments to victim participation through final
prosecution.409 Defendants know this. 410 When a case cannot go forward
without the victim’s testimony, defendants are incentivized to make crossexamination particularly unpleasant in hopes the victim recants or
withdraws.411 Thus, in some cases, the primary defense tactic involves
employing a “brutal cross-examination” to destroy the victim. 412 The
victim’s behavior, sexual history, psychological well-being, and lifestyle
are paraded publicly. 413 Humiliating details about her body and personal
life may be revealed in questioning.414 The victim’s imagined fears thus
become reality. She may simply relent or recant rather than suffer an
inevitable indignity.
North Carolina Rule 609 imposes yet another impediment to victim
participation. Its purported function is to reveal a witness’s mendacious
character. The rule is not limited to crimes of dishonesty, however. 415 It
encompasses thousands of offenses. 416 When the victim’s prior crimes
403. Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1362 (“Many prosecutors, fearing the
victims’ potential recusal, come to regard accusers as saboteurs.”).
404. St. Joan, supra note 301, at 265, 282.
405. Held, supra note 363, at 448–49 (detailing the deplorable state of untested rape kits).
406. Id. at 447–52.
407. See Fan, supra note 301, at 787.
408. See id. at 785–89.
409. See Bruton, supra note 301, at 178; Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at
1357–58.
410. See Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1366 (observing that defendants and
defense counsel are well aware of the need for victim participation and therefore have an interest
in making cross-examination so unpleasant the victim elects to discontinue participation).
411. Id. at 1361.
412. Id. at 1362; Luban, supra note 349, at 1028.
413. Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1361; Schotland, supra note 348, at 28.
414. Schotland, supra note 348, at 28.
415. See supra notes 219–23 and accompanying text.
416. See supra notes 242–47 and accompanying text.
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reveal risky, foolish, or immoral behavior, the rule functions in fact as one
more source of public embarrassment. 417 The state’s broad impeachment
rule also facilitates senseless psychological trauma the victim would
understandably want to avoid. For example, the domestic victim may
perceive conviction-based impeachment as confirming the type of verbal
abuse she has endured. Permitting attacks on her credibility with innocuous
crimes mirrors the coercive tactics the defendant may have employed
throughout their relationship. His threats that “nobody will believe you,”
“they don’t know the real you,” and “if you say anything I will destroy
you,” are confirmed by broad conviction-based impeachment.
Naturally, any voluntary witness would reconsider a scenario that
involved being publicly humiliated with the witness’s criminal record. Few
would elect to withstand such an ordeal willingly. For a North Carolina
victim, that calculus is psychologically intertwined with knowing the
torment will come from her attacker. She is not merely castigated with her
criminal record by an unknown person. The defendant himself or his
lawyer will demand she account for her criminal foibles. 418 That attacks on
her character come from the defendant, either personally or by proxy,
further disincentivizes the victim’s participation at trial.419
A victim’s reluctance to cooperate with the prosecution is equally
justified by North Carolina courts’ own reluctance to intervene. Her fear
that cross-examination will turn into a humiliating exposé is hardly
misplaced when the law makes her criminal record fair game for attack and
denies trial judges the discretion to curb its use. A victim-witness who
possesses even a modest criminal record has yet another valid reason to
avoid a North Carolina criminal justice system that seems stacked against
her when trial courts fail to intervene. Using our prior hypothetical to
illustrate, consider the inevitable conversation between the prosecutor and
victim in the weeks preceding trial:
P: We also need to discuss your criminal record.
V: Why? I’m not in trouble am I?
P: No. No, you’re not.
V: Then why do we need to talk about my record?
P: Because it will probably come up at trial.
V: What? Why would it come up then?
417. See generally Bruton, supra note 301, at 175 (“[S]ome questions do not advance a truthseeking function at all, but instead serve only to embarrass or abuse.”).
418. Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1360.
419. See Fan, supra note 301, at 789–90; Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at
1366.
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P: Because defense counsel can use it to challenge you.
V: I don’t understand.
P: North Carolina law allows witnesses to be challenged with their
criminal convictions.
V: They’re going to ask me about stuff from high school?
P: They may. All of your convictions can be used to impeach you.
V: Impeach me?
P: Suggest that you are not telling the truth.
V: They’re going to say I’m lying about being raped because of
those stupid things?
P: They are allowed to, yes.
V: What does that have to do with what he did to me?
P: Well, nothing, but the law says the jury can consider your
convictions.
V: Jurors are going to consider my convictions?
P: They are permitted to, yes.
V: Can’t the judge stop this?
D: No. And that’s why we need to talk about how to address them.
V: This is unbelievable . . .
A federal prosecutor could offer markedly different advice to the same
victim, reassuring her that, under the federal rules, her misdemeanor
offenses would be off limits for impeaching her at trial. The federal
prosecutor could assuage any lingering doubts by filing a pretrial motion to
exclude her convictions under Federal Rule 609. The victim would have
confidence going forward knowing the judge would prevent disparaging
forays into her criminal past. She could trust the judicial system to protect
her from this kind of public embarrassment. Likewise, the federal
prosecutor could focus on addressing her other fears knowing her criminal
record would not deter her from cooperating further.
The cross-examination tactics that may be employed at trial rank
among the critical factors victims contemplate when deciding whether to
testify.420 North Carolina victims who possess a criminal record face an

420. Luban, supra note 349, at 1030 (“[T]he nightmare of the woman who has been raped on
a date and does not report it because she is afraid of what will happen to her reputation during the
trial is real.” (emphasis added)).
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additional factor weighing against participation. Knowing she may be
impeached with her criminal past is one more reason to decline assisting
prosecution. The effect of that decision is simply too great––particularly
when weighed against the negligible value crimes unrelated to truthfulness
have in assessing witness credibility. When survivors elect to forgo
assisting prosecution, guilty persons avoid accountability for their crimes.
They remain at large to reinjure the victim or others. North Carolina Rule
609 thus compels an irreconcilable paradox: the judicial system that affords
justice for the victim is the same system that systemically discourages her
participation.
IV. PROPOSED REFORM TO NORTH CAROLINA RULE 609
The negative repercussions to victim-witnesses alone compel
reforming North Carolina’s current impeachment practices. 421 While little
scholarship has been devoted to the impact of conviction-based
impeachment on victim-witnesses, the harmful effects associated with the
practice generally are well documented. 422 Scholars have proposed
alternatives for years to rectify the abuses inherent in a rule that exposes
jurors to damning evidence about the witness’s past and, correspondingly,
tends to chill the participation of witnesses vital to the justice system. 423
This Article adds a victim-focused perspective to that chorus, proposing
revisions to North Carolina Rule 609 to rid it of the harmful side effects
associated with conviction-based impeachment previously revealed and
now being exposed.
Reforming conviction-based impeachment practices offers several
alternatives. One approach would prohibit impeachment with priorconviction evidence entirely. 424 Another involves mimicking the federal
rule.425 Although both would represent significant reform to North Carolina
practice, each is problematic. A new rule that is narrow in focus, relying
less on subjective tests and jury instructions, is preferable.
A.

Credibility in Focus

The sole purpose of impeaching a witness with her criminal record
should be to challenge her credibility as a truth-telling witness.426 Starting
421. The deleterious impact on accused persons is undeniable as well. This issue, however, is
the subject of the author’s future scholarship and beyond the scope of this Article.
422. See supra note 8.
423. See supra notes 8–10.
424. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
425. See supra notes 133–38 and accompanying text.
426. Rule 609’s focus is explicit: “For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,”
evidence of the witness’s prior criminal convictions may be elicited. N.C. R. EVID. 609(a).

97 N.C. L. REV. 1553 (2019)

2019]

VICTIMS UNDER ATTACK

1617

with this premise focuses the task. Crimes that primarily bear upon this
singular question are the most viable and should be included; those that do
not deserve exclusion.
Certainly, one option for curing the ills associated with convictionbased impeachment would be to ban the practice. Hawaii and Montana
elected this approach after concluding the harms simply outweigh the
benefits.427 Similarly, the Uniform Rules suggest an outright ban on using
convictions to impeach accused persons. 428 Categorical bans raise
significant concerns, however. While laudable for focusing juror attention
solely on the case questions, they deny jurors information directly related
to the credibility of the witness. Respecting the defendant’s confrontation
rights by leaving open a narrow cross-examination window is a key
consideration. 429 And a witness previously convicted of perjury should not
be shielded from rules primarily designed to protect against unfair
character assumptions. 430 Simply put, excluding all prior convictions for
impeaching witness credibility is overly exclusive.
How to delineate between the crimes that directly correlate to witness
untruthfulness against those that do not becomes the critical question. The
long history of contemplating witness impeachment provides the answer.
The consensus of rule drafters is that crimes involving dishonesty or false
statements most directly impugn witness credibility. 431 These crimen falsi
offenses, including perjury, embezzlement, criminal fraud, and false
statements, have long been recognized as bearing directly on an
individual’s credibility as a truth-telling witness.432 The proof in
establishing crimen falsi crimes offers assurance that the witness has
engaged in acts directly correlated to falsity. These crimes fit the narrow
focus of testing witness credibility and therefore warrant inclusion for juror
consideration.
Admitting crimes not involving dishonesty or false statements invites
harmful side effects and is therefore inadvisable. Offenses that do not
involve proving dishonesty as an element only impugn witness credibility
Therefore, the convictions permitted under that rule must be considered solely in the context of
their intended purpose—to evaluate witness credibility. Bellin, Circumventing Congress, supra
note 8, at 310 n.80.
427. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
428. See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
429. Jules Epstein, True Lies: The Constitutional and Evidentiary Bases for Admitting Prior
False Accusation Evidence in Sexual Assault Prosecutions, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 609, 632–33
(2006).
430. See Simmons, supra note 7, at 997–98.
431. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2); UNIF. R. EVID. 21 (1953); MODEL CODE OF EVID. R. 106
(AM. LAW. INST. 1942).
432. Ladd, supra note 77, at 179–80 (“The relationship of these crimes to veracity is selfevident.”).
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on the generalized presumption that, by committing an offense, the
individual may be more willing to testify untruthfully. 433 This hypothesis is
equally as unconfirmed as juror misuse of such crimes is established. 434
Certainly Federal Rule 609 endorses broadly admitting generic convictions
by permitting witness impeachment with any prior felony. 435 The wisdom
in doing so has been the subject of pointed, reasoned criticism for
decades.436
The harms associated with admitting crimes unrelated to dishonesty
are myriad. All are rooted in the fact that these convictions generate
negative side effects disproportionate to evaluating witness credibility. The
probative value of crimes unrelated to dishonesty is simply low or
nonexistent. A crime committed in the heat of passion says something
about the actor in that precise moment but little about him far removed
from it.437 A person who commits a crime because of addiction says a great
deal about her dependency but nothing about her veracity. 438 Crimes
involving violence, drugs, and sexual misconduct are serious offenses to be
sure. They do not, however, directly correlate to untruthfulness to the same
extent as crimes involving false statements. 439
The prejudicial effect of admitting a broad range of crimes––whether
felonies or misdemeanors––unrelated to dishonest acts is markedly
disproportionate. The witness who recognizes the jury will see her criminal
record as bearing on her personal behavior is incentivized to forgo
testifying.440 The accused person who realizes he will be viewed as a mere
criminal recidivist will elect silence. 441 The juror exposed to conviction
evidence is invited to conform to misplaced stereotypes. 442 Senseless
revictimization trauma is imposed on the victim. 443 Embarrassment and
humiliation to the survivor are obvious byproducts. 444 These effects and
more plague broad conviction usage. 445 Narrowing the rule to crimes that
directly correlate with witness veracity resolves these issues.

433. Id. at 176.
434. Id. at 186; see also Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948); Gold,
supra note 99, at 2313.
435. See supra Section I.D.
436. See sources cited supra note 8.
437. See Ladd, supra note 77, at 178–79
438. Bellin, Circumventing Congress, supra note 8, at 302–03.
439. Surratt, supra note 82, at 931.
440. See supra Section III.C.
441. Bellin, Silence Penalty, supra note 8, at 415–24.
442. See supra Section III.A.
443. See supra Section III.B.
444. See supra Section III.C.
445. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
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Rejecting Broad Crimes Subject to Balancing Tests

Some impeachment rules, including the federal rules, incorporate
judicial balancing tests in an effort to ameliorate the dangers associated
with broad inclusion of crimes unrelated to dishonesty. 446 One option for
revising North Carolina Rule 609 would be to mimic this approach.
However, several decades of application and analysis of the federal rule
reveal this option to be too fraught with error and inconsistency.
Broadly incorporating convictions subject to judicial oversight to
weigh the probative value against its prejudicial effect promotes
inconsistency. Trial judges come from all walks of life. Their backgrounds
and experiences, like all persons, influence their worldview. As a result,
judicial decisions admitting or excluding convictions for impeachment
purposes can vary widely. 447 Some judges admit convictions in a seemingly
indiscriminate manner whereas others are more exacting. 448 A prosecutor
moving to exclude a victim’s conviction for drug possession may be
successful in some courts but not in others. Different trial judges applying
subjective balancing tests to a broad range of convictions naturally means
inconsistent results. In the years since the adoption of Federal Rule 609,
appellate courts have languished over tests intended to assist trial judges in
making discretionary decisions. 449 More often than not, the tests themselves
become a source of confusion or judicial justification. 450
Crafting a rule that incorporates an array of crimes subject to trial
court discretion enables judicial stereotyping and bias to creep in, whether
intentional or not. 451 The judge grown weary from domestic abuse may
admit a victim-witness’s prior crimes out of unrealized apathy or
frustration.452 The jurist unwittingly influenced by cultural myths about
sexual assault may be more inclined to permit impeachment with crimes
involving risk-taking or immoral behavior. 453 This is not to disparage the
state’s able judges; it is simply an acknowledgement of documented human
behavior. Cultural myths are difficult to displace even over many
generations.
Finally, leaving a door open to revealing a witness’s prior conviction
too often encourages juror misuse and lawyer abuse. When crimes are
unrelated to dishonesty, jurors are far more inclined to consider them as
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.

See supra notes 133, 138 and accompanying text.
See Simmons, supra note 7, at 1030.
Id.
See Bellin, Circumventing Congress, supra note 8, at 312–29.
Id. at 330–40.
See supra Section III.C.
See id.
See supra Section III.A.
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supporting preconceived myths, stereotypes, and a witness’s propensity for
wrongdoing instead of the witness’s credibility. 454 Jury instructions to the
contrary are widely regarded as ineffective and, in fact, tend to make things
worse by highlighting the impropriety. 455 Likewise, trial lawyers beholden
to the constructs of the adversarial system will naturally take the
opportunity to reveal crimes for any purpose that may benefit their client’s
cause. That the byproduct of doing so may revictimize the witness or
perpetuate harmful stereotypes indicts the rule that condones the
impeachment far more than the lawyer who employs it.
A rule that broadly admits crimes subject to individual judicial
balancing would, among other documented ills, needlessly invite
inconsistent rulings, disparate treatment of witnesses, judicial stereotyping,
juror misuse, and trial lawyer abuse.
C.

A Reformed Rule 609

Rather than clinging to outmoded, faulty assumptions that any crime
begets untruthful testimony, a reasoned approach that embraces modern
understandings of witness testimony and jury bias should be employed. A
simple change would protect victim-witnesses and enhance the foundations
of the state’s justice system.
North Carolina Rule 609(a) now reads:
(a) General rule.—For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a felony, or
of a Class A1, Class 1, or Class 2 misdemeanor, shall be admitted if
elicited from the witness or established by public record during
cross-examination or thereafter. 456
Rule 609(a) should be amended to read as follows:
(a) General rule.—For the purpose of questioning the credibility of a
witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime may
be admitted, subject to Rule 403, where the court can readily
determine that establishing the elements of the crime required
proving—or the witness admitting—a dishonest act or false
statement, such as perjury, subordination of perjury, false statement,
embezzlement, or criminal fraud.
The revised rule narrows the range of crimes available to impeach all
witnesses. It also offers a narrow window for judicial discretion to exclude
convictions in the limited cases where their admission would do more harm
454. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948); supra Section III.A.
455. Gold, supra note 10, at 692–96.
456. N.C. R. EVID. 609(a).
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than good.457 To be sure, not all crimes of dishonesty are so probative of
witness untruthfulness to warrant mandatory inclusion. For example, the
victim who pled guilty to passing a worthless check because she needed
food after escaping her abuser has committed a crime out of desperation
and not mendacious character.
The proposed revision promotes an important policy goal of
protecting victim-witnesses from the abuses currently fostered by the
state’s broad approach. It also has the concomitant effect of encouraging all
persons with knowledge to more freely testify without fear of jurors
misusing prior-conviction evidence to demonize them. And it would inhibit
trial lawyers from injecting character assaults under the auspices of
credibility checks. Notably, the amendment is neither a whimsical nor
radical concept. It is, in fact, entirely consistent with the original proposal
for Rule 609 suggested by the North Carolina Evidence Laws Study
Committee some thirty-five years ago. 458 Their first proposal was the right
one.
CONCLUSION
North Carolina impeachment practices continue to be guided by the
dead hand of the common law. While the federal system modified
conviction-based impeachment decades ago, North Carolina stood its
ground. As states have refined impeachment rules over the years, North
Carolina has remained mired in the past. Now, as the impact of convictionbased impeachment is being fully understood, North Carolina’s regressive
approach cannot afford to become fossilized.
As enacted and interpreted, North Carolina Rule of Evidence 609
enables character assassinations under the pretense of questioning
credibility. The state’s adherence to ancient dogma has a devastating effect
on victim-witnesses and the judicial system as a whole. Survivors are
subject to being castigated with their prior criminal misdeeds.
Impeachment focused on character attacks cuts to the heart of the
individual, causing senseless revictimization trauma to persons already
abused. At the same time, jurors are invited to degrade survivors by

457. United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[The] major function [of
Rule 403] is limited to excluding matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the
heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.”).
458. Memorandum from Donald B. Hunt, supra note 209 (proposing originally to limit
convictions available for impeachment to crimes involving “some element of deceit,
untruthfulness, or falsification bearing upon the witness’s propensity to testify truthfully, such as
perjury or subordination of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false
pretense or other crime in the nature of crimen falsi”); see supra notes 209–11 and accompanying
text.
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applying cultural myths about violent acts and negative stereotypes
concerning victim behavior. Victims contemplating testifying may simply
retreat, to the detriment of societal interests.
This Article is not intended to undermine the crucial and historical
importance of a pointed cross-examination but to infuse reliability and
decency into the process. Trial outcomes tainted by systemic infirmities are
most inexcusable when easily avoidable. Acquittals or convictions curated
by injecting misplaced conviction evidence into trials circumvent the proof
process and undermine confidence in the justice system. Sound policy
demands trial results be sustained on reliable, relevant evidence rather than
unfounded myths and stereotypes.
Revising North Carolina Rule 609 is an opportunity to take
measurable steps toward eliminating harmful structural components within
the state’s justice system. A rule that narrows the focus of impeachment
benefits all witnesses—victims and the accused alike. Senseless ventures
into a witness’s past offenses that have no bearing on untruthful conduct,
and even less on predicting false testimony, function primarily to misdirect
the trial process. The sole purpose of impeaching a witness with her priorconviction history is to enable the jury to evaluate her credibility as a
truthful witness. Nothing more; nothing less. From this precept we can
reevaluate the crimes that bear primarily on this issue and this issue alone.
Crimes that involve proving dishonesty or false statement do just that. All
others invite harms on the participants and the process.

